Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DELAWARE v. PENNSYLVANIA ET AL.

ON EXCEPTIONS TO REPORTS OF SPECIAL MASTER

No. 145, Orig. Argued October 3, 2022—Decided February 28, 2023* A State may take custody of abandoned property located within its bor- ders; this process is commonly known as “escheatment.” When aban- doned property is intangible, however, the lack of a physical location means that multiple States may have arguable claims. In these cases, the question is which States have the right to escheat two financial products sold by banks on behalf of MoneyGram: Agent Checks and Teller’s Checks (collectively, Disputed Instruments). Operating much like money orders, both products are prepaid financial instruments used to transfer funds to a named payee. When these prepaid instru- ments are not presented for payment within a certain period of time, they are deemed abandoned, and, currently, MoneyGram applies the common-law escheatment practices outlined in Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674. There the Court established the rule that the proceeds of abandoned financial products should escheat to the State of the cred- itor’s last known address, id., at 680–681, or where such records are not kept, to the State in which the company holding the funds is incor- porated, id., at 682. Because MoneyGram does not, as a matter of reg- ular business practice, keep records of creditor addresses for the two products at issue in this case, it applies the secondary common-law rule and transmits the abandoned proceeds to its State of incorpora- tion, i.e., Delaware. Multiple States invoked this Court’s original jurisdiction to deter- mine whether the abandoned proceeds of the Disputed Instruments are governed by the Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Trav- eler’s Checks Act (Federal Disposition Act or FDA) rather than the —————— * Together with No. 146, Orig., Arkansas et al. v. Delaware, also on ex- ceptions to reports of Special Master. 2 DELAWARE v. PENNSYLVANIA

Syllabus

common law. The FDA provides that “a money order . . . or other sim- ilar written instrument (other than a third party bank check)” should generally escheat to “the State in which such . . . instrument was pur- chased.” 12 U. S. C. §2503. This Court consolidated the actions and appointed a Special Master. In his initial report, the Special Master concluded that the Disputed Instruments were covered by the FDA. Following oral argument in this Court, he reassessed that decision and issued a second report, concluding that many of the Disputed Instru- ments were or could be “third party bank check[s],” which are excluded from the FDA and would generally escheat to Delaware under the cir- cumstances. Held: The Disputed Instruments are sufficiently “similar” to a money or- der to fall within the FDA. Pp. 9–23. (a) The parties disagree whether the Disputed Instruments qualify as “money order[s]” or “other similar written instrument[s] (other than a third party bank check)” under §2503. Because a finding that the Disputed Instruments are similar to money orders would be sufficient to bring the Disputed Instruments within §2503’s reach, the Court need not decide whether they actually are money orders. Instead, the Court concludes that the Disputed Instruments are sufficiently “simi- lar” to money orders