Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NEW YORK v. NEW JERSEY

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

No. 156, Orig. Argued March 1, 2023—Decided April 18, 2023 In 1953, New York and New Jersey exercised their authority under Article I, §10, of the Constitution to enter into a compact to address corruption at the Port of New York and New Jersey. The Waterfront Commission Compact established a bistate agency known as the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, to which the States delegated their sovereign authority to conduct regulatory and law- enforcement activities at the Port. The Compact does not address each State’s power to withdraw from the Compact. In 2018, New Jersey sought to unilaterally withdraw from the Compact, over New York’s opposition. New York filed a bill of complaint in this Court, and the parties then filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, with the United States supporting New Jersey as amicus curiae. Held: New Jersey may unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact notwithstanding New York’s opposition. Pp. 3– 9. (a) The interpretation of an interstate compact approved by Congress presents a federal question, see Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 438, the resolution of which begins with an examination of “the express terms of the Compact,” Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U. S. 614, 628. Unlike certain other compacts, the Compact here does not address withdrawal. Because the Compact is silent as to unilateral withdrawal, the Court looks to background principles of law that would have informed the parties’ understanding when they entered the Compact. As relevant here, interstate compacts “are construed as contracts under the principles of contract law.” Ibid. Under the default contract-law rule at the time of the Compact’s formation, a contract that contemplates “continuing performance for an indefinite time is to be interpreted as 2 NEW YORK v. NEW JERSEY

Syllabus

stipulating only for performance terminable at the will of either party.” 1 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §4:23, p. 570. Here, the States delegated their sovereign authority to the Commission on an ongoing and indefinite basis. The default contract-law rule therefore “speaks in the silence of the Compact” and indicates that either State may unilaterally withdraw. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U. S. 767, 784. Principles of state sovereignty also support New Jersey’s position. “The background notion that a State does not easily cede its sovereignty has informed” this Court’s “interpretation of interstate compacts.” Tarrant, 569 U. S., at 631. The nature of the delegation at issue here—delegation of a State’s sovereign power to protect the people, property, and economic activity within its borders—buttresses the conclusion that New Jersey can unilaterally withdraw. To be clear, the contract-law rule that governs the Compact here does not apply to other kinds of compacts that do not exclusively call for ongoing performance on an indefinite basis—such as compacts setting boundaries, apportioning water rights, or otherwise conveying property interests. Pp. 3–7. (b) New York’s additional arguments in support of its view that the Compact should be read to prohibit unilateral withdrawal are unpersuas