Volume 598 U. S. Part 2 Pages 432–448

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT May 18, 2023

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 432 OCTOBER TERM, 2022

Syllabus

POLSELLI et al. v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit No. 21–1599. Argued March 29, 2023—Decided May 18, 2023 The Internal Revenue Service has the power to issue summonses to pur- sue unpaid federal taxes and the people who owe them. When the IRS issues a summons, it must generally provide notice to any person identi- fed in the summons, 26 U. S. C. § 7609(a)(1). Anyone entitled to such notice may then bring a motion to quash the summons, § 7609(b)(2)(A). But when the IRS issues a summons “in aid of the collection of . . . an assessment made . . . against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued,” no notice is required, § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). In this case, the IRS entered official assessments against Remo Polselli for more than $2 million in unpaid taxes and penalties. Reve- nue Offcer Michael Bryant issued summonses to three banks seeking fnancial records of several third parties, including petitioners, who then moved to quash the summonses. The District Court concluded that, Page Proof Pending Publication under § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), no notice was required and that petitioners therefore could not bring a motion to quash. The Sixth Circuit af- frmed, fnding that the summonses fell squarely within the exception in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the general notice requirement. Held: The Court rejects petitioners' argument that the exception to the notice requirement in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies only if the delinquent tax- payer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned by the IRS. Pp. 438–445. (a) The statute sets forth three conditions to exempt the IRS from providing notice in circumstances like these. First, a summons must be “issued in aid of . . . collection,” § 7609(c)(2)(D). Second, it must aid the collection of “an assessment made or judgment rendered,” § 7609(c) (2)(D)(i). Third, a summons must aid the collection of assessments or judgments “against the person with respect to whose liability the sum- mons is issued,” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). The statute does not mention legal interest, much less require that a taxpayer maintain such an interest for the exception to apply. Pp. 438–439. (b) Petitioners' arguments in support of their proposed legal interest test do not convince the Court to abandon an ordinary reading of the notice exception. Petitioners frst contend the phrase “in aid of the collection” refers only to inquiries that “directly advance” the IRS's col- lection efforts, which a summons will not accomplish unless it is targeted Cite as: 598 U. S. 432 (2023) 433

Syllabus

at an account containing assets that the IRS can collect to satisfy the taxpayer's liability. This argument ignores the typical meaning of “in aid of.” To “aid” means “[t]o help” or “assist.” A summons that may not itself reveal taxpayer assets that can be collected may nonetheless help the IRS fnd such assets. Petitioners next argue that if § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) is read to exempt from notice every summons that helps the IRS collect an “assessment” against a delinquent taxpayer, there wo