Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

POLSELLI ET AL. v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–1599. Argued March 29, 2023—Decided May 18, 2023 The Internal Revenue Service has the power to issue summonses to pur- sue unpaid federal taxes and the people who owe them. When the IRS issues a summons, it must generally provide notice to any person iden- tified in the summons, §7609(a)(1). Anyone entitled to such notice may then bring a motion to quash the summons, §7609(b)(2)(A). But when the IRS issues a summons “in aid of the collection of . . . an assessment made . . . against the person with respect to whose liability the sum- mons is issued,” no notice is required, §7609(c)(2)(D)(i). In this case, the IRS entered official assessments against Remo Polselli for more than $2 million in unpaid taxes and penalties. Reve- nue Officer Michael Bryant issued summonses to three banks seeking financial records of several third parties, including petitioners, who then moved to quash the summonses. The District Court concluded that, under §7609(c)(2)(D)(i), no notice was required and that petition- ers therefore could not bring a motion to quash. The Sixth Circuit af- firmed, finding that the summonses fell squarely within the exception in §7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the general notice requirement. Held: The Court rejects petitioners’ argument that the exception to the notice requirement in §7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies only if the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned by the IRS. Pp. 5–12. (a) The statute sets forth three conditions to exempt the IRS from providing notice in circumstances like these. First, a summons must be “issued in aid of . . . collection,” §7609(c)(2)(D). Second, it must aid the collection of “an assessment made or judgment rendered,” §7609(c)(2)(D)(i). Third, a summons must aid the collection of assess- ments or judgments “against the person with respect to whose liability 2 POLSELLI v. IRS

Syllabus

the summons is issued,” §7609(c)(2)(D)(i). The statute does not men- tion legal interest, much less require that a taxpayer maintain such an interest for the exception to apply. Pp. 5–7. (b) Petitioners’ arguments in support of their proposed legal interest test do not convince the Court to abandon an ordinary reading of the notice exception. Petitioners first contend the phrase “in aid of the collection” refers only to inquiries that “directly advance” the IRS’s col- lection efforts, which a summons will not accomplish unless it is tar- geted at an account containing assets that the IRS can collect to satisfy the taxpayer’s liability. This argument ignores the typical meaning of “in aid of.” To “aid” means “[t]o help” or “assist.” A summons that may not itself reveal taxpayer assets that can be collected may nonetheless help the IRS find such assets. Petitioners next argue that if §7609(c)(2)(D)(i) is read to exempt from notice every summons that helps the IRS collect an “assessment” against a delinquent taxpayer, there would be no work left for the sec- ond exception to notice, found in §7609(c)(2)(D)(ii), to do. Clause (ii) exempts from notice any summons “issued in aid of the collection of . . . the liability at law