Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 Pages 110–139

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT June 8, 2023

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 110 OCTOBER TERM, 2022

Syllabus

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fth circuit No. 22–10. Argued February 27, 2023—Decided June 8, 2023 Petitioner David Dubin was convicted of healthcare fraud under 18 U. S. C. § 1347 after he overbilled Medicaid for psychological testing performed by the company he helped manage. The question is whether, in de- frauding Medicaid, he also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft” under § 1028A(a)(1). Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant, “during and in relation to any [predicate offense, such as healthcare fraud], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identifcation of another person.” The Government argued below that § 1028A(a)(1) was automatically satisfed because Dubin's fraudulent Medicaid billing included the patient's Medicaid reimburse- ment number—a “means of identifcation.” Bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, the District Court allowed Dubin's conviction for aggravated identity theft to stand, even though, in the District Court's view, the Page Proof Pending Publication crux of the case was fraudulent billing, not identity theft. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affrmed in a fractured decision, with fve concur- ring judges acknowledging that under the Government's reading of § 1028A(a)(1), “the elements of [the] offense are not captured or even fairly described by the words `identity theft.' ” 27 F. 4th 1021, 1024 (opinion of Richman, C. J.). Held: Under § 1028A(a)(1), a defendant “uses” another person's means of identifcation “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal. Pp. 116–132. (a) This case turns on the scope of two of § 1028A(a)(1)'s elements: Dubin was convicted under § 1028A(a)(1) for “us[ing]” a patient's means of identifcation “in relation to” healthcare fraud. On the Government's view, a defendant “uses” a means of identifcation “in relation to” a pred- icate offense if the defendant employs that means of identifcation to facilitate or further the predicate offense in some way. Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any time a name or other means of identifcation happens to be part of the payment or billing method used in the commission of a long list of predicate offenses. Dubin's more targeted reading requires that the use of a means of iden- tifcation have “a genuine nexus” to the predicate offense. When the underlying crime involves fraud or deceit, as many of § 1028A's predi- cates do, this entails using a means of identifcation specifcally in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of a pay- Cite as: 599 U. S. 110 (2023) 111

Syllabus

ment or billing method. A careful examination of § 1028A(a)(1)'s text and structure points to a narrower reading. Pp. 116–118. (b) The terms “uses” and “in relation to” have been singled out by this Court as being particularly sensitive to context. The “various defnitions of `use' imply action and implementation.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145. Beyond that general concept, however, “ `use' takes