Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–10. Argued February 27, 2023—Decided June 8, 2023 Petitioner David Dubin was convicted of healthcare fraud under 18 U. S. C. §1347 after he overbilled Medicaid for psychological testing performed by the company he helped manage. The question is whether, in defrauding Medicaid, he also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft” under §1028A(a)(1). Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant, “during and in relation to any [predicate offense, such as healthcare fraud], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” The Government argued below that §1028A(a)(1) was automatically satis- fied because Dubin’s fraudulent Medicaid billing included the patient’s Medicaid reimbursement number—a “means of identification.” Bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, the District Court allowed Dubin’s convic- tion for aggravated identity theft to stand, even though, in the District Court’s view, the crux of the case was fraudulent billing, not identity theft. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed in a fractured deci- sion, with five concurring judges acknowledging that under the Gov- ernment’s reading of §1028A(a)(1), “the elements of [the] offense are not captured or even fairly described by the words ‘identity theft.’ ” 27 F. 4th 1021, 1024 (opinion of Richman, C. J.). Held: Under §1028A(a)(1), a defendant “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal. Pp. 4–21. (a) This case turns on the scope of two of §1028A(a)(1)’s elements: Dubin was convicted under §1028A(a)(1) for “us[ing]” a patient’s means of identification “in relation to” healthcare fraud. On the Gov- ernment’s view, a defendant “uses” a means of identification “in rela- tion to” a predicate offense if the defendant employs that means of identification to facilitate or further the predicate offense in some way. 2 DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any time a name or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or billing method used in the commission of a long list of predicate of- fenses. Dubin’s more targeted reading requires that the use of a means of identification have “a genuine nexus” to the predicate offense. When the underlying crime involves fraud or deceit, as many of §1028A’s predicates do, this entails using a means of identification specifically in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of a payment or billing method. A careful examination of §1028A(a)(1)’s text and structure points to a narrower reading. Pp. 4–5. (b) The terms “uses” and “in relation to” have been singled out by this Court as being particularly sensitive to context. The “various def- initions of ‘use’ imply action and implementation.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145. Beyond that general concept, however, “ ‘use’ takes on different meanings depending on context.” Id., at 143. This requires looking “not only to the word itself, but also to the statute and the [surrounding] scheme, to determine