Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HAALAND, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL. v. BRACKEEN ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–376. Argued November 9, 2022—Decided June 15, 2023* This case arises from three separate child custody proceedings governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a federal statute that aims to keep Indian children connected to Indian families. ICWA governs state court adoption and foster care proceedings involving Indian chil- dren. Among other things, the Act requires placement of an Indian child according to the Act’s hierarchical preferences, unless the state court finds “good cause” to depart from them. 25 U. S. C. §§1915(a), (b). Under those preferences, Indian families or institutions from any tribe (not just the tribe to which the child has a tie) outrank unrelated non-Indians or non-Indian institutions. Further, the child’s tribe may pass a resolution altering the prioritization order. §1915(c). The pref- erences of the Indian child or her parent generally cannot trump those set by statute or tribal resolution. In involuntary proceedings, the Act mandates that the Indian child’s parent or custodian and tribe be given notice of any custody proceed- ings, as well as the right to intervene. §§1912(a), (b), (c). Section 1912(d) requires a party seeking to terminate parental rights or to re- move an Indian child from an unsafe environment to “satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent breakup of the Indian family,” and a court cannot order relief unless the party demonstrates, by a heightened burden of proof and expert testimony, that the child is —————— * Together with No. 21–377, Cherokee Nation et al. v. Brackeen et al., No. 21–378, Texas v. Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al., and No. 21–380, Brackeen et al. v. Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 2 HAALAND v. BRACKEEN

Syllabus

likely to suffer “serious emotional or physical damage” if the parent or Indian custodian retains custody. §§1912(d), (e). Even for voluntary proceedings, a biological parent who gives up an Indian child cannot necessarily choose the child’s foster or adoptive parents. The child’s tribe has “a right to intervene at any point in [a] proceeding” to place a child in foster care or terminate parental rights, as well as a right to collaterally attack the state court’s custody decree. §§1911(c), 1914. The tribe thus can sometimes enforce ICWA’s placement preferences against the wishes of one or both biological parents, even after the child is living with a new family. Finally, the States must keep certain records related to child placements, see §1915(e), and transmit to the Secretary of the Interior all final adoption decrees and other specified information, see §1951(a). Petitioners—a birth mother, foster and adoptive parents, and the State of Texas—filed this suit in federal court against the United States and other federal parties. Several Indian Tribes intervened to defend the law alongside the federal parties. Petitioners challenged ICWA as unconstitutional on multiple grounds. They asserted that Congress lacks authority to