Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SMITH v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 21–1576. Argued March 28, 2023—Decided June 15, 2023 Timothy Smith was indicted in the Northern District of Florida for theft of trade secrets from a website owned by StrikeLines. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue, citing the Constitution’s Venue Clause, Art. III, §2, cl. 3, and its Vicinage Clause, Amdt. 6. Smith argued that trial in the Northern District of Florida was improper because he had accessed StrikeLines’ website from his home in Mobile (in the Southern District of Alabama) and the servers storing StrikeLines’ data were located in Orlando (in the Middle Dis- trict of Florida). The District Court concluded that factual disputes related to venue should be resolved by the jury and denied Smith’s mo- tion to dismiss without prejudice. The jury found Smith guilty, and Smith moved for a judgment of acquittal based on improper venue. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29. The District Court denied the motion, rea- soning that the effects of Smith’s crime were felt at StrikeLines’ head- quarters, located in the Northern District of Florida. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that venue was improper, but disagreed with Smith that a trial in an improper venue barred reprosecution. The Eleventh Circuit therefore vacated Smith’s conviction for theft of trade secrets. Held: The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Pp. 3–16. (a) Except as prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, it “has long been the rule that when a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, un- satisfied conviction, he may be retried in the normal course of events.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 121. In all circumstances outside of the Speedy Trial Clause, the strongest appropriate remedy for trial error is a new trial, not a judgment barring reprosecution. Pp. 3–4. 2 SMITH v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

(1) Text and precedent provide no basis for concluding that viola- tions of the Venue and Vicinage Clauses are exceptions to the retrial rule. The Venue Clause mandates that the “Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the . . . Crimes shall have been com- mitted.” Art. III, §2, cl. 3. Nothing about this language suggests that a new trial in the proper venue is not an adequate remedy for its vio- lation. Smith primarily argues that the Venue Clause aims to prevent the infliction of additional harm on a defendant who has already un- dergone the hardship of an initial trial in a distant and improper place. But the mere burden of a second trial has never justified an exemption from the retrial rule. See Ewell, 383 U. S., at 121. Indeed, while the most convenient trial venue for a defendant would presumably be where he lives, the Venue Clause is keyed to the location of the alleged crimes. The Clause does not allow “variation . . . for convenience of the . . . accused,” Johnston v. United States, 351 U. S. 215, 221, and this Court has repeatedly rejected objections based on the hardships cre- ated when a defendant is prosecuted far from home. The Vicinage Cl