Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 Pages 600–634

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT June 22, 2023

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 600 OCTOBER TERM, 2022

Syllabus

PUGIN v. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 22–23. Argued April 17, 2023—Decided June 22, 2023* In two immigration proceedings, noncitizens Fernando Cordero-Garcia and Jean Francois Pugin were determined removable from the United States on the ground that they had convictions for aggravated felonies— namely, offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit con- cluded that Cordero-Garcia's state conviction for dissuading a witness from reporting a crime did not constitute an offense “relating to obstruc- tion of justice” because the state offense did not require that an invest- igation or proceeding be pending. By contrast, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Pugin's state conviction for accessory after the fact constituted an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” even if the state offense did not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Page Proof Pending Publication Held: An offense may “relat[e] to obstruction of justice” under § 1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Federal law provides that noncitizens con- victed of a federal or state crime constituting an “aggravated felony” are removable from the United States. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Congress expanded the defnition of “aggravated felony” in 1996 to include of- fenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” § 1101(a)(43)(S). Dictionary defnitions, federal laws, state laws, and the Model Penal Code show that federal or state obstruction offenses “relat[e] to obstruction of jus- tice” under § 1101(a)(43)(S) even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. This extensive body of author- ity refects common sense. Individuals can obstruct the process of jus- tice even when an investigation or proceeding is not pending. Indeed, obstruction of justice is often “most effective” when it prevents “an investigation or proceeding from commencing in the frst place.” Brief for Attorney General 15. The Court declines to adopt an interpretation of the statute that would exclude many common obstruction offenses from the defnition of aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S). Finally,

*Together with No. 22–331, Garland, Attorney General v. Cordero- Garcia, aka Cordero, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Cite as: 599 U. S. 600 (2023) 601

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the phrase “relating to” resolves any doubt about the scope of § 1101(a)(43)(S), because it ensures that the statute covers offenses hav- ing a connection with obstruction of justice—which surely covers com- mon obstruction offenses that can occur when an investigation or pro- ceeding is not pending. Pugin's and Cordero-Garcia's contrary arguments lack merit. First, even if a specifc prohibition in 18 U. S. C. § 1503(a) requires that an investigation or proceeding be pending, Congress defned offenses under § 1101(a)(43)(S) more broadly. Second, the historical record does not