Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 Pages 762–812

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT June 23, 2023

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 762 OCTOBER TERM, 2022

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 22–179. Argued March 27, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023 Respondent Helaman Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U. S. citizenship through “adult adoption.” But that was a scam. Though there is no path to citizenship through “adult adoption,” Hansen earned nearly $2 million from his scheme. The United States charged Hansen with, inter alia, violating 8 U. S. C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” Hansen was convicted and moved to dismiss the clause (iv) charges on First Amendment over- breadth grounds. The District Court rejected Hansen's argument, but the Ninth Circuit concluded that clause (iv) was unconstitutionally overbroad. Held: Because § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation Page Proof and facilitation of specifcPending Publication acts known to violate is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Pp. 769–785. federal law, the clause

(a) Hansen's First Amendment overbreadth challenge rests on the claim that clause (iv) punishes so much protected speech that it cannot be applied to anyone, including him. A court will hold a statute facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if the law “prohibits a substan- tial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292. In such a cir- cumstance, society's interest in free expression outweighs its interest in the statute's lawful applications. Otherwise, courts must handle uncon- stitutional applications as they usually do—case-by-case. Pp. 769–770. (b) The issue here is whether Congress used “encourage” and “in- duce” in clause (iv) as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (thus capturing only a narrow band of speech) or instead as those terms are used in ordinary conversation (thus encompassing a broader swath). Pp. 770–774. (1) Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an un- lawful act, and facilitation—i. e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense's com- mission. Neither requires lending physical aid; for both, words may be enough. And both require an intent to bring about a particular unlaw- ful act. The terms “encourage” and “induce,” found in clause (iv), are Cite as: 599 U. S. 762 (2023) 763

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among the “most common” verbs used to denote solicitation and facilita- tion. 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.2(a). Their special- ized usage is displayed in the federal criminal code as well as the crimi- nal laws of every State. If the challenged statute uses those terms as they are typically understood in the criminal law, an overbreadth chal- lenge would be hard to sustain. Pp. 771–773. (2)