Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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CUMMINGS v. PREMIER REHAB KELLER, P.L.L.C.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–219. Argued November 30, 2021—Decided April 28, 2022 Jane Cummings, who is deaf and legally blind, sought physical therapy services from Premier Rehab Keller and asked Premier Rehab to pro- vide an American Sign Language interpreter at her sessions. Premier Rehab declined to do so, telling Cummings that the therapist could communicate with her through other means. Cummings later filed a lawsuit seeking damages and other relief against Premier Rehab, al- leging that its failure to provide an ASL interpreter constituted dis- crimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Affordable Care Act. Premier Rehab is subject to these statutes, which apply to entities that receive federal financial assistance, because it receives reimbursement through Medicare and Medicaid for the provision of some of its services. The District Court determined that the only compensable injuries allegedly caused by Premier Rehab were emotional in nature. It held that damages for emotional harm are not recoverable in private actions brought to en- force either statute. The District Court thus dismissed the complaint, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Held: Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act. Pp. 3–15. (a) Congress has broad power under the Spending Clause of the Con- stitution to “fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17. Pursuant to that authority, Congress has enacted statutes prohibiting recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of certain protected characteristics. This Court has held that such statutes may be enforced through implied rights of action. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 185. Although it is “beyond dispute that 2 CUMMINGS v. PREMIER REHAB KELLER

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private individuals may sue” to enforce the antidiscrimination statutes at issue here, “it is less clear what remedies are available in such a suit.” Ibid. The Court’s cases have clarified that whether a particular remedy is recoverable must be informed by the way Spending Clause “statutes operate”: by “conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a con- tract between the Government and the recipient of funds.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U. S. 274, 286. Because Spending Clause legislation operates based on consent, the “legitimacy of Congress’ power” to enact such laws rests not on its sovereign au- thority, but on “whether the [recipient] voluntarily and knowingly ac- cepts the terms of th[at] ‘contract.’ ” Barnes, 536 U. S., at 186 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17). The Court has regularly applied this con- tract-law analogy to define the scope of conduct for which funding re- cipients may be held liable, with an eye toward ensuring that recipi- ents had notice of their obligations. “The same analogy,” Barnes, 536 U. S., at 187, similarly limits “the scope of availa