Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DENEZPI v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–7622. Argued February 22, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022 An officer with the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs filed a criminal com- plaint against Merle Denezpi, a member of the Navajo Nation, charg- ing Denezpi with three crimes alleged to have occurred at a house lo- cated within the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation: assault and battery, in violation of 6 Ute Mountain Ute Code §2; terroristic threats, in vio- lation of 25 CFR §11.402; and false imprisonment, in violation of 25 CFR §11.404. The complaint was filed in a CFR court, a court which administers justice for Indian tribes in certain parts of Indian country “where tribal courts have not been established.” §11.102. Denezpi pleaded guilty to the assault and battery charge and was sentenced to time served—140 days’ imprisonment. Six months later, a federal grand jury in the District of Colorado indicted Denezpi on one count of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country, an offense covered by the federal Major Crimes Act. Denezpi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the consecutive pros- ecution. The District Court denied Denezpi’s motion. Denezpi was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Tenth Cir- cuit affirmed. Held: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Pp. 4–13. (a) The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” By its terms, the Clause does not prohibit twice placing a person in jeopardy “ ‘for the same conduct or actions,’ ” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___, but focuses on whether successive prosecutions are for the same “offence.” In 1791, “offence” meant the violation of a law. See ibid. Because the sovereign source 2 DENEZPI v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

of a law is an inherent and distinctive feature of the law itself, an of- fense defined by one sovereign is necessarily a different offense from that of another sovereign. See id., at ___. The two offenses can there- fore be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause—even if they have identical elements and could not be sepa- rately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. See id., at ___, n. 1, ___. This dual-sovereignty principle applies where “two entities derive their power to punish from wholly independent sources.” Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 579 U. S. 59, 68. Denezpi’s single act transgressed two laws: the Ute Mountain Ute Code’s assault and battery ordinance and the United States Code’s proscription of aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country. The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe exercised its “unique” sovereign authority in adopting the tribal ordinance. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 323. Likewise, Congress exercised the United States’ sovereign power in enacting the federal criminal statute. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 382. The two laws—defined by separate sover- eigns—proscribe separate offenses, so Denezpi’s second prosecution did not pla