Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 20–322. Argued January 11, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022* Respondents are aliens who were detained by the Federal Government pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Respondents Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo Gutierrez Sanchez—the named plaintiffs in the case that bears Ale- man Gonzalez’s name—are natives and citizens of Mexico who were detained under §1231(a)(6) after reentering the United States ille- gally. They filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that aliens de- tained under §1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months’ detention. The District Court certified a class of similarly sit- uated plaintiffs and “enjoined [the Government] from detaining [re- spondents] and the class members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing.” Gonzalez v. Sessions, 325 F. R. D. 616, 629. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F. 3d 762, 766. Respondent Edwin Flores Tejada—the named plaintiff in the case that bears his name—is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He likewise reentered the country illegally and was detained under §1231(a)(6). He filed suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that §1231(a)(6) enti- tled him to a bond hearing. The District Court certified a class, granted partial summary judgment against the Government, and en- tered class-wide injunctive relief. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Flores Tejada v. Godfrey, 954 F. 3d 1245, 1247. This Court granted certiorari and instructed the parties to brief the threshold —————— * Together with Garland, Attorney General, et al. v. Flores Tejada et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court. 2 GARLAND v. ALEMAN GONZALEZ

Syllabus

question whether the District Courts had jurisdiction to entertain re- spondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief under the INA. Held: Section 1252(f )(1) of the INA deprived the District Courts of juris- diction to entertain respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive re- lief. Pp. 3–10. (a) Section 1252(f )(1) generally strips lower courts of “jurisdiction or authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain provisions of the INA. The ordinary meaning of the terms “enjoin” and “restrain” bars the class-wide relief awarded by the two District Courts here. When a court “enjoins” conduct, it issues an “injunction,” which is a judicial order that “tells someone what to do or not to do.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 428. The Court has suggested that “restrain” sometimes has a “broad meaning” that refers to judicial orders that “inhibit” particular actions, and at other times it has a “narrower meaning” that includes “orders that stop (or perhaps compel)” such acts. Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 575 U. S. 1, 12–13. In §1252(f )(1), the object of the verbs “enjoin or restrain” is the “operation of ” certain provisions of the INA—provisions that charge the Federal Government with the implementation and enforcement of the immi- gra