Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CARSON, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF O. C., ET AL. v. MAKIN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 20–1088. Argued December 8, 2021—Decided June 21, 2022 Maine has enacted a program of tuition assistance for parents who live in school districts that neither operate a secondary school of their own nor contract with a particular school in another district. Under that program, parents designate the secondary school they would like their child to attend, and the school district transmits payments to that school to help defray the costs of tuition. Participating private schools must meet certain requirements to be eligible to receive tuition pay- ments, including either accreditation from the New England Associa- tion of Schools and Colleges (NEASC) or approval from the Maine De- partment of Education. But they may otherwise differ from Maine public schools in various ways. Since 1981, however, Maine has lim- ited tuition assistance payments to “nonsectarian” schools. Petitioners sought tuition assistance to send their children to Ban- gor Christian Schools (BCS) and Temple Academy. Although both BCS and Temple Academy are accredited by NEASC, the schools do not qualify as “nonsectarian” and are thus ineligible to receive tuition payments under Maine’s tuition assistance program. Petitioners sued the commissioner of the Maine Department of Education, alleging that the “nonsectarian” requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court rejected petitioners’ constitutional claims and granted judgment to the commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed. Held: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally avail- able tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause. Pp. 6–18. (a) The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects 2 CARSON v. MAKIN

Syllabus

against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.” Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 450. The Court recently applied this principle in the context of two state efforts to withhold otherwise avail- able public benefits from religious organizations. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, the Court considered a Missouri program that offered grants to qualifying nonprofit organi- zations that installed cushioning playground surfaces, but denied such grants to any applicant that was owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not permit Missouri to “expressly discriminate[ ] against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.” 582 U. S., at ___–___. And in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, the Court held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause by prohibiting fami- lies from using otherwise available scholarship funds at religious sch