Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200U.S.321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 19–511. Argued December 8, 2020—Decided April 1, 2021 The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) proscribes abu- sive telemarketing practices by, among other things, restricting cer- tain communications made with an “automatic telephone dialing sys- tem.” The TCPA defines such “autodialers” as equipment with the capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, us- ing a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those num- bers. 47 U.S. C. §227(a)(1). Petitioner Facebook, Inc., maintains a social media platform that, as a security feature, allows users to elect to receive text messages when someone attempts to log in to the user’s account from a new device or browser. Facebook sent such texts to Noah Duguid, alerting him to login activity on a Facebook account linked to his telephone number, but Duguid never created that account (or any account on Facebook). Duguid tried without success to stop the unwanted messages, and eventually brought a putative class action against Facebook. He alleged that Facebook violated the TCPA by maintaining a database that stored phone numbers and programming its equipment to send automated text messages. Facebook countered that the TCPA does not apply because the technology it used to text Duguid did not use a “random or sequential number generator.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that §227(a)(1) applies to a notifica- tion system like Facebook’s that has the capacity to dial automatically stored numbers. Held: To qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the TCPA, a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator, or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. Pp. 4–12. 2 FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID

Syllabus

(a) This case turns on whether the clause “using a random or se- quential number generator” in §227(a)(1)(A) modifies both of the two verbs that precede it (“store” and “produce”), as Facebook contends, or only the closest one (“produce”), as maintained by Duguid. The most natural reading of the text and other aspects of §227(a)(1)(A) confirm Facebook’s view. First, in an ordinary case, the “series-qualifier canon” instructs that a modifier at the end of a series of nouns or verbs applies to the entire series. Here, that canon indicates that the modi- fying phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” quali- fies both antecedent verbs, “store” and “produce.” Second, the modify- ing phrase immediately follows a concise, integrated clause (“store or produce telephone numbers to be called”), which uses the word “or” to connect two verbs that share a common direct object (“telephone num- bers to be called”). Given this structure, it would be odd to apply the modifier to just one part of the cohesive clause. Third, the comma in §227(a)(1)(A) separating the modifying phrase from the antecedents suggests that the qualifier applies to all of the antecedents, instead of just the nearest one. Pp. 4–6. Duguid’s insistence that a limiting clause should ordinarily be read as modifying only