Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200U.S.321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

McKINNEY v. ARIZONA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA No. 18–1109. Argued December 11, 2019—Decided February 25, 2020 An Arizona jury convicted petitioner James McKinney of two counts of first-degree murder. The trial judge found aggravating circumstances for both murders, weighed the aggravating and mitigating circum- stances, and sentenced McKinney to death. Nearly 20 years later, the Ninth Circuit held on habeas review that the Arizona courts violated Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455U.S.104, by failing to properly consider as relevant mitigating evidence McKinney’s posttraumatic stress disor- der. McKinney’s case then returned to the Arizona Supreme Court. McKinney argued that he was entitled to a jury resentencing, but the Arizona Supreme Court itself reweighed the aggravating and mitigat- ing circumstances, as permitted by Clemons v. Mississippi, 494U.S.738, and upheld both death sentences. Held: A Clemons reweighing is a permissible remedy for an Eddings er- ror, and when an Eddings error is found on collateral review, a state appellate court may conduct a Clemons reweighing on collateral re- view. McKinney’s argument that a jury must resentence him does not square with Clemons, where the Court held that a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence may be conducted by an appellate court. 494U.S.741. Because Clemons involved an improperly con- sidered aggravating circumstance, McKinney maintains that it is in- apposite here, where the case involves an improperly ignored mitigat- ing circumstance. Clemons, however, did not depend on any unique effect of aggravators as distinct from mitigators. For purposes of ap- pellate reweighing, there is no meaningful difference between sub- tracting an aggravator from one side of the scale and adding a mitiga- tor to the other side. McKinney also argues that Clemons is no longer good law in the wake of Ring v. Arizona, 536U.S.584, and Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. ___, where the Court held that a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible. 2 MCKINNEY v. ARIZONA

Syllabus

But that does not mean that a jury is constitutionally required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the ultimate sentencing decision within the relevant sentencing range. See Ap- prendi v. New Jersey, 530U.S.466, 481. McKinney notes that the Arizona trial court, not the jury, made the initial aggravating circum- stance finding that made him eligible for the death penalty. But McKinney’s case became final on direct review long before Ring and Hurst, which do not apply retroactively on collateral review, see Schriro v. Summerlin, 542U.S.348, 358, and the Arizona Supreme Court’s 2018 decision reweighing the aggravators and mitigators did not constitute a reopening of direct review. Pp. 2–7. 245 Ariz. 225, 426 P.3d 1204, affirmed.

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1

Opinion of the Court

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