Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVICES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–1039. Argued February 26, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025 Petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, has worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services in various roles since 2004. In 2019, the agency interviewed Ames for a new management position but ultimately hired another candidate—a lesbian woman. The agency subsequently demoted Ames from her role as a program administrator and later hired a gay man to fill that role. Ames then filed this lawsuit against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orienta- tion. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The courts below analyzed Ames’s claims under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, which sets forth the traditional framework for evaluating disparate- treatment claims that rest on circumstantial evidence. At the first step of that framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. Like the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held that Ames had failed to meet her prima facie burden because she had not shown “ ‘background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’ ” 87 F. 4th 822, 825. The court reasoned that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make this showing “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima- facie case.” Ibid. Held: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which re- quires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents. Pp. 4–9. (a) Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision bars employers from in- tentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, 2 AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

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color, religion, sex, or national origin. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e– 2(a)(1). For most plaintiffs, the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—stating a prima facie case of discrimination—is “not on- erous.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253. The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule requires plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to bear an additional burden at step one. But the text of Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. The provision focuses on individuals rather than groups, barring discrimination against “any individual” because of protected characteristics. Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone. This Court’s precedents reinforce that understanding of the statute, and make clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment un- der Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 (“[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and onl