Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC., ET AL. v. WISCONSIN LABOR AND INDUSTRY REVIEW COMMISSION ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

No. 24–154. Argued March 31, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025 Wisconsin law exempts certain religious organizations from paying un- employment compensation taxes. The relevant statute exempts non- profit organizations “operated primarily for religious purposes” and “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” Wis. Stat. §108.02(15)(h)(2). Petitioners, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four of its subentities, sought this exemption as organizations controlled by the Roman Cath- olic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court de- nied the exemption, holding that petitioners were not “operated pri- marily for religious purposes” because they neither engaged in proselytization nor limited their charitable services to Catholics. Held: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of §108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment. Pp. 7–15. (a) The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational preference to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s interpretation of §108.02(15)(h)(2) imposes a denominational preference by differentiat- ing between religions based on theological lines. Petitioners’ eligibility for the exemption ultimately turns on inherently religious choices (namely, whether to proselytize or serve only co-religionists in the course of charitable work), not “ ‘secular criteria’ ” that “happen to have a ‘disparate impact’ upon different religious organizations.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 247, n. 33. Because that regime explicitly dif- ferentiates between religions based on theological practices, strict scrutiny applies. Pp. 8–11. 2 CATHOLIC CHARITIES BUREAU, INC. v. WISCONSIN LABOR & INDUSTRY REVIEW COMM’N Syllabus

(b) The State argues that, when it comes to religious accommoda- tions afforded by the government, courts should ask whether the ac- commodation’s eligibility criteria are the product of “invidious discrim- ination” to determine if strict scrutiny applies. In support of that rule, the State draws on Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437. Gillette, however, is inapposite. Unlike the conscientious objector status in Gil- lette, which was equally available to members of all religions, the Wis- consin Supreme Court’s interpretation of §108.02(15)(h)(2) facially dif- ferentiates among religions based on inherently theological choices. The State next disputes the premise that petitioners were denied cov- erage because they do not proselytize or serve only Catholics in the course of performing charitable work. The State instead claims that petitioners were excluded because they engaged in no “distinctively re- ligious activity,” meaning “activities that express and inculcate reli- gious doctrine.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 81. That understanding of the Wis- consin Supreme Court’s ruling, even if assumed correct, cannot save the statute from strict scrutiny because decisions about whether to “ex- press and inculcate religious doctrine” while performing charitable work are fundamentally theo