PRECEDENTIAL

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
               _____________

                   No. 18-1463
                  _____________

               MAUREEN RICCIO,
          on behalf of herself and all others
                 similarly situated,
                               Appellant

                          v.

             SENTRY CREDIT, INC.;
               JOHN DOES 1-25


  On Appeal from the United States District Court
             for the District of New Jersey
           District Court No. 3-17-cv-01773
  District Judge: The Honorable Brian R. Martinotti

             Argued February 19, 2020

   Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, AMBRO,
CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY,
  JR., SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS,
   PORTER, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
                (Filed: March 30, 2020)

Joseph K. Jones                [ARGUED]
Benjamin J. Wolf
Jones Wolf & Kapasi
375 Passaic Avenue
Suite 100
Fairfield, NJ 07004
       Counsel for Appellant

Jacob C. Cohn               [ARGUED]
Gordon Reese Scully Mansukhani
Three Logan Square
1717 Arch Street, Suite 610
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Peter G. Siachos
Gordon Reese Scully Mansukhani
18 Columbia Turnpike
Suite 220
Florham Park, NJ 07932
       Counsel for Appellee




                           2
                ____________________

              OPINION OF THE COURT
               _____________________


SMITH, Chief Judge.

    This case presents a question of statutory
interpretation: does 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) allow debtors
to orally dispute a debt’s validity?
   It also presents a question of stare decisis: should our
en banc Court resolve a circuit conflict by overturning a
three-decades-old panel decision which has been eroded
by intervening Supreme Court authority?
    Because we answer both questions affirmatively, we
will overrule Graziano v. Harrison’s contrary
interpretation of § 1692g(a)(3) and affirm.
                            I
                            A

   The statutory interpretation question arises from
language which appears in the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 

–1692p (FDCPA). The
FDCPA protects against abusive debt collection practices


                            3
by imposing restrictions and obligations on third-party
debt collectors. See §§ 1692b–1692j.

   This case concerns one of those requirements: that debt
collectors send debtors a letter notifying them of their right
to dispute the debt. See § 1692g. Section 1692g(a)
specifies five things the letter, often called a “validation
notice,” must include:
      (1) the amount of the debt;

      (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt
      is owed;

      (3) a statement that unless the consumer,
      within thirty days after receipt of the notice,
      disputes the validity of the debt, or any
      portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to
      be valid by the debt collector;
      (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies
      the debt collector in writing within the thirty-
      day period that the debt, or any portion
      thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will
      obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a
      judgment against the consumer and a copy of
      such verification or judgment will be mailed
      to the consumer by the debt collector; and



                              4
      (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s
      written request within the thirty-day period,
      the debt collector will provide the consumer
      with the name and address of the original
      creditor, if different from the current creditor.
   The question presented is whether the letter must
require all disputes to be in writing, or whether
§ 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes.
   Before answering that question, it is instructive to
examine other protections the FDCPA provides when
debts are disputed. For instance, § 1692g(b) demands t