(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2019                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

, 337.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

                         McKINNEY v. ARIZONA

        CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

No. 18–1109. Argued December 11, 2019—Decided February 25, 2020
An Arizona jury convicted petitioner James McKinney of two counts of
 first-degree murder. The trial judge found aggravating circumstances
 for both murders, weighed the aggravating and mitigating circum-
 stances, and sentenced McKinney to death. Nearly 20 years later, the
 Ninth Circuit held on habeas review that the Arizona courts violated
 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 

, by failing to properly consider as
 relevant mitigating evidence McKinney’s posttraumatic stress disor-
 der. McKinney’s case then returned to the Arizona Supreme Court.
 McKinney argued that he was entitled to a jury resentencing, but the
 Arizona Supreme Court itself reweighed the aggravating and mitigat-
 ing circumstances, as permitted by Clemons v. Mississippi, 

, and upheld both death sentences.
Held: A Clemons reweighing is a permissible remedy for an Eddings er-
 ror, and when an Eddings error is found on collateral review, a state
 appellate court may conduct a Clemons reweighing on collateral re-
 view. McKinney’s argument that a jury must resentence him does not
 square with Clemons, where the Court held that a reweighing of the
 aggravating and mitigating evidence may be conducted by an appellate
 

. Because Clemons involved an improperly con-
 sidered aggravating circumstance, McKinney maintains that it is in-
 apposite here, where the case involves an improperly ignored mitigat-
 ing circumstance. Clemons, however, did not depend on any unique
 effect of aggravators as distinct from mitigators. For purposes of ap-
 pellate reweighing, there is no meaningful difference between sub-
 tracting an aggravator from one side of the scale and adding a mitiga-
 tor to the other side. McKinney also argues that Clemons is no longer
 good law in the wake of Ring v. Arizona, 

, and Hurst v.
 Florida, 577 U. S. ___, where the Court held that a jury must find the
 aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible.
2                        MCKINNEY v. ARIZONA

                                  Syllabus

    But that does not mean that a jury is constitutionally required to weigh
    the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the ultimate
    sentencing decision within the relevant sentencing range. See Ap-
    prendi v. New Jersey, 

, 481. McKinney notes that the
    Arizona trial court, not the jury, made the initial aggravating circum-
    stance finding that made him eligible for the death penalty. But
    McKinney’s case became final on direct review long before Ring and
    Hurst, which do not apply retroactively on collateral review, see
    Schriro v. Summerlin, 

, 358, and the Arizona Supreme
    Court’s 2018 decision reweighing the aggravators and mitigators did
    not constitute a reopening of direct review. Pp. 2–7.

, 

, affirmed.

   KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,
joined.
                        Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)                                 1