(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2019                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

, 337.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

   BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v. AMERICAN
    ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS,
                  INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                 THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

         No. 19–631.      Argued May 6, 2020—Decided July 6, 2020
In response to consumer complaints, Congress passed the Telephone
  Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) to prohibit, inter alia, almost
  all robocalls to cell phones. 

(b)(1)(A)(iii). In 2015, Con-
  gress amended the robocall restriction, carving out a new government-
  debt exception that allows robocalls made solely to collect a debt owed
  to or guaranteed by the United States. 

. The American
  Association of Political Consultants and three other organizations that
  participate in the political system filed a declaratory judgment action,
  claiming that §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) violated the First Amendment. The
  District Court determined that the robocall restriction with the gov-
  ernment-debt exception was content-based but that it survived strict
  scrutiny because of the Government’s compelling interest in collecting
  debt. The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment, agreeing that the robo-
  call restriction with the government-debt exception was a content-
  based speech restriction, but holding that the law could not withstand
  strict scrutiny. The court invalidated the government-debt exception
  and applied traditional severability principles to sever it from the ro-
  bocall restriction.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.

, affirmed.
    JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
  THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded in Part II that the 2015 gov-
  ernment-debt exception violates the First Amendment. Pp. 6–9.
    (a) The Free Speech Clause provides that government generally “has
  no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
2              BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL
                        CONSULTANTS, INC.
                             Syllabus

    subject matter, or its content.” Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 

, 95. Under this Court’s precedents, content-based laws are
    subject to strict scrutiny. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 

,
    165. Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)’s robocall restriction, with the govern-
    ment-debt exception, is content based because it favors speech made
    for the purpose of collecting government debt over political and other
    speech. Pp. 6–7.
       (b) The Government’s arguments for deeming the statute content-
    neutral are unpersuasive. First, §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) does not draw dis-
    tinctions based on speakers, and even if it did, that would not “auto-
    matically render the distinction content neutral.” Reed, 576 U. S., at
    170. Second, the law here focuses on whether the caller is speaking
    about a particular topic and not, as the Government contends, simply
    on whether the caller is engaged in a particular economic activity. See
    Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 

, 563–564. Third, while “the
    First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce
    or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech,” this law “does
    not simply have an effect on speech, but is directed at certain content
    and is aimed at particular speakers