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1996(4) Supreme 42
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.S. Anand and Faizan Uddin, JJ.
Kirtikant D. Vadodaria -Appellant
versus
State of Gujarat & Anr. -Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 537 of 1993
Decided on 26-4-1996
Held : In view of the above discussion it follows that the expression mother , in clause (d) of Section 125(1) of the Code, means and is referable only to the real or natural mother, who has actually given birth to the child and if that be so, the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Havaben Beline s case (supra) that the word mother occurring in clause (d) of Section 125(1) includes a woman who has the status of a step-mother by reason of her lawful marriage with the father of the person sought to be made liable for maintenance under Section 125, cannot be accepted. This assumption of the meaning of the expression mother by legal fiction would mean some thing which is not so intended by the legislature. For the same reasons the view taken by the Orissa High Court in Petei Bewa s case (supra), cannot also be accepted as it adopts the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court in preference to Bombay High Court which took the view that the word mother used in Section 125(1)(d) of the Code, will have to be given its natural meaning and so construed it will mean only the natural mother and will not include the step-mother, who in common parlance is a distinct and separate entity and cannot be equated with one s own mother. The High Court of Allahabad in case of Ganga Saran Varshney (supra) was mainly concerned with the question of jurisdiction with reference to the place where maintenance petition could be filed and there is no elaborate discussion on the question whether a step-mother would include in the expression "mother" in Section 125(1)(d) of the Code or not. In our considered opinion the view expressed by the High Courts of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, with regard to the meaning of the expression mother in Section 125(1)(d) of the Code is the correct view and the contrary view of the Gujarat High Court, Orissa High Court and the Allahabad High Court (supra) is not the correct view. (Para 14)
(ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Section 125(1)(d)-Maintenance claim by step-mother against step-son-To achieve special objective under law, a childless step-mother may claim maintenance from her step-son provided she is widow or her husband, if living, is also incapable of supporting and maintaining her-Maintenance order in favour of step-mother against appellant, step- son-Husband of claimant possessed of sufficient means and property-Natural born sons were also well to do-Prima facie claimant proceeded against step-son with a view to punish and harass him-She is not entitled to any maintenance. (Paras 15 & 16)
Key Points: - The judgment holds that the term "mother" in Section 125(1)(d) Cr.P.C. means the real/natural mother, not a step-mother. (!) (!) (!) - It analyzes conflicting High Court decisions and ultimately adopts the view that a childless step-mother may claim maintenance from her step-son only under liberal construction if she is a widow or if her husband is unable to maintain her, to achieve social justice under Section 125 Cr.P.C. (!) (!) - It emphasizes the social object and liberal construction of Section 125 to prevent destitution, enabling maintenance for wives, children, and parents, but restricts step-son liability to step-mother under specific conditions. (!) - The Court sets aside lower court orders and dismisses the maintenance petition of the step-mother against the step-son, while noting that any amount already received need not be refunded. (!) - It references the statutory text of Section 125(1) and Explanation to interpret "mother" and "wife" in the context of maintenance. (!) (!) (!)
JUDGMENT
Faizan Uddin, J.-This appeal has been directed against the order dated April 12, 1993 passed by a learned Single Judge of Gujarat High Court in a Special Criminal Application No. 496 of 1993 dismissing the petition of the appellant, affirming the judgment dated March 23, 1993 passed by the City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision Application No. 338 of 1992, arising out of an order dated October 16, 1992 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 7, Ahmedabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 163 of 1989 awarding maintenance to respondent No. 2, Smt. Manjulaben, the step-mother of the appellant.
2. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to set-out the facts briefly.
3. The appellant is the son of Dahyalal Hirachand Vadodaria from his first wife. When the appellant was a child of tender age, his mother expired and after about an year, Dahyalal Hirachand took respondent No. 2, Smt. Manjulaben as his second wife, from whom 5 sons and 2 daughters were born. All the 5 sons and daughters from the above named second wife are major. First of all, Dahyalal Hirachand, the father of the appellant alone made a Miscellaneous Application No. 190 of 1984 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate. Ist Class, Surendra Nagar, claiming maintenance from his son, the appellant, contending that the appellant was serving as a Manager in Central Bank of India and was earning Rs.5,000/- per month in addition to rental income of Rs.1,000/- per month. The appellant contested the said application by pleading that besides the 5 sons from the second wife who are all earning members, his father himself was a person of sufficient means and assets and, therefore, the appellant was not liable to pay any maintenance allowance.
4. The learned Magistrate on evaluation of evidence found that Dilip, one of the natural born sons of the respondent No. 2 herein, had contested the Municipal Election, while the other two natural born sons of respondent No. 2 - Niranjan and Bharat - were carrying on business of selling clothes and books respectively on the pavements of Bombay and appellant s father Dahyalal Hirachand was engaged in selling Rasna Chemicals, Detergent Powder, Cello-tape, Readymade frocks etc. and was giving Rs. 180/- per month as salary to his servant and was also getting Rs. 108/- per month as rent from tenants and that he had shown his monthly income of Rs. 550/- per month in the Ration Card. He had received 52,000 as consideration for sale of his houses and possessed some jewellery etc. and on that basis recorded the finding that Dahyalal Hirachand was a wealthy and rich person and the main dispute between them was with regard to distribution of shares in the properties and, therefore, he was not entitled for any maintenance from the appellant. The learned Magistrate consequently dismissed his maintenance petition. In the revisional Court, a settlement was arrived at between the father and the appellant.
5. Subsequently, another maintenance petition was jointly filed by appellant s father Dahyalal Hirachand and his second wife Smt. Manjulaben (respondent No. 2) claiming a sum of Rs. 500/- per month as maintenance from the appellant, out of which the present appeal arises. The respondent No. 2, Smt. Manjulaben and her husband Dahyalal Hirachand claimed maintenance from the appellant by contending that the appellant was brought up and educated by them and was drawing a handsome salary as the Manager of the Bank and since they are not possessed of sufficient means to maintain themselves and that their 3 sons from Smt. Manjulaben, respondent No. 2 herein, have meagre income from their small business and the 2 youngest sons had recently completed their studies but were unemployed and, therefore, the appellant was liable for their maintenance. The appellant contested by denying that the natural born sons of respondent No. 2 had meagre income and were not possessed of sufficient means to main
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