IMPORTANT POINT
Mere passing of an order of ejectment against a person claiming to be in adverse possession neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession which alone breaks the continuity of possession.

Headnote:Limitation Act, 1963-Article 65-Adverse possession-Mere passing of an order of ejectment against a person claiming adverse possession neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession-Actual dispossession alone would break continuity of possession.
The fact remained that in spite of order of the Tehsildar against the appellant which was not acted upon, nor executed, the appellant continued in possession of the suit land and, therefore, the continuity of his possession of the suit land was neither interrupted nor lost. Mere passing of an order of ejectment against a person claiming to be in adverse possession neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession which alone breaks the continuity of possession. The fact that under Section 250(2) of the M.P.L.R. Code read with Section 38 thereof the Tehsildar was bound to restore possession of the suit land would, in our view, make no difference and it is difficult to accept the contention that failure of the Tehsildar in handing over possession would have the effect of causing discontinuation of possession of the suit land by the appellant so as to prevent such possession from ripening into adverse possession after statutory period. (Paras 10 & 11)

JUDGEMENT

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri. J.-This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Bench at Gwalior) in Civil Second Appeal No. 161 of 1991 dated September 1, 1994. The plaintiff in the suit (Case No.51-A/86 in the court of Second Civil Judge Class I, Guna, Madhya Pradesh) is the appellant. He laid the suit for declaration of his title on the ground that by adverse possession he perfected his title to the agriculture land bearing Survey No. 1216, admeasuring 1.902 hectares (Khasara No. 1216 area 9 bighas 2 visvas) situated in village Guna, Tehsil and District Guna, Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as, the suit land ) and for permanent injunction against respondent Nos.1 to 4 on December 6, 1986.

2. The following facts need to be noticed for understanding the controversy between the parties. The appellant claimed that be purchased the suit land for consideration of Rs. 451/- from Sukhlal and Phulchand who were said to be the owners thereof on August 25, 1960. The suit land was under attachment by orders of the Tehsildar, Guna and in the auction that followed the attachment, one Mohan Singh purchased it in the name of his minor son Rajendra Singh in 1963. Rajendra Singh through guardian - his father Mohan Singh - filed an application under Section 250 of Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1959, before the Tehsilar, Guna, against the appellant claiming restoration of possession of the suit land. On the alleged ground of interference in his possession, the appellant instituted a suit (for declaration praying for declaration and injunction) (Civil Suit No. 82A/64) in the court of Civil Judge, Class II, against Rajendra Singh & Mohan Singh and his vendors (Sukhlal & Phoolchand) in 1964. On December 23, 1966 the suit was dismissed holding that the sale in his favour was not valid. Notwithstanding the dismissal of that suit, he remained in possession of the suit land. On June 20, 1971, the Tehsildar ordered the appellant to put the said Rajendra Singh in possession of the suit land. Against that order the appellant filed an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer who dismissed the appeal on September 4, 1973. While so Rajendra Singh sold the suit land to respondent Nos.2 and 4; respondent No.1 is husband of respondent No.2 and respondent No.3 is the husband of respondent No.4. The appellant, however, continued to remain in the possession of the suit land. The said respondents resisted the suit denying the possession of the appellant and pleading that Mohan Singh and Rajendra Singh were in continuous possession of the suit land and that the appellant acquired no title to the suit land. They stated that the appellant failed in the Civil Court, Revenue Court, and before the Executive, Magistrate and therefore that suit was also liable to be dismissed.

3. After considering the evidence placed before it the trial Court found that the appellant had been in continuous possession of the suit land and perfected his title by adverse possession. Accordingly, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed by the trial Court. Against the judgment and decree of the trial Court, respondent Nos.1 to 4 filed appeal (Civil Appeal No.97-A/1990) before the IInd Additional District Judge, Guna. On 30 July, 1991, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The said respondents filed Civil Second Appeal No. 161 of, 1991 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Bench at Gwaliar), which was allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, by the impugned judgment and decree.

4. Mr. Niraj Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that inasmuch as the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court found that the appellant had perfected his title by adverse possession, the High Court erred in reversing the well-considered judgments of the lower courts on the ground that possession of the appellant was not sufficient in the eye of law to confer the title

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

2001 Supreme(SC) 128

IMPORTANT POINTMere passing of an order of ejectment against a person claiming to be in adverse possession neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession which alone breaks the continuity of possession.

Cases Referred (3)

IMPORTANT POINT
Mere passing of an order of ejectment against a person claiming to be in adverse possession neither causes his dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession which alone breaks the continuity of possession.