1955 Supreme(SC) 8

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
3rd February 1955
S.R. DAS, BHAGWATI AND IMAM JJ.
The Automobile Products of India, Ltd. and others, Appellants
Versus
Rukmaji Bala and others, Respondents.
The Union of India, Intervenor.
Civil Appeals Nos. 2 and 4 of 1955.
Advocates appeared
Messrs. H. M. Seervai, J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, Advocates, for Appellant (in C. A. No. 2 of 1955) and Respondent (in C. A. No. 4 of 1955) ; Messrs. D. H. Buch & I. N. Shroff, Advocates, for Respondents (in C.A No. 2 of 1955) and Appellants (In C. A. No. 4 of 1955); Mr. M. C. Setalvad. Attorney -General of India, (Messrs. G. N. Joshi and P. G. Gokhale, Advocates, with him), for the Intervener (Union of India).

Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (as amended in 1950), Sections 31, 33, 33A-Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, Sections. 22, 23, 29 Scope.

       The appellant company carried on business as assemblers of motor vehicles from completely knocked down" assemblies imported into India. There was some appeal pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal arising out of disputes between the appellant company and its workmen. For some reason the appellant company was unable to secure further import licenses for the import of completely knocked down assemblies of motor vehicles and consequently on and from 1-11-1953 the company had to layoff a number of its workmen, for it had to operate the various departments of its factory at greatly reduced strength. It therefore became necessary to retrench some of the workmen. As these workmen were concerned with the appeal pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the company applied to the Appellate Tribunal under S. 22 of the 1950 Act for permission to retrench them. The Labour Tribunal decided:

       "There can be little doubt that the retrenchment has been occasioned by the failure of the concern to secure sufficient work owing to absence of licenses from Government and, therefore, retrenchment must be regarded as inevitable and the application before us a bona fide. Permission to retrench cannot be refused but for the reasons that we shall state hereafter we make that permission conditional upon the fulfilment of certain terms by the concern."

       The company contended before the Labour Appellate Tribunal that its functions, while dealing with an application under S. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, was only to give or withhold permission. This contention was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal with the following observation:

       That view is quite untenable as has been repeatedly held by this tribunal. We are the authority to whom an application has to be made for permission to retrench, and when such an application is made we must of necessity exercise a judgment and discretion and satisfy ourselves that when the company retrenches it does justice by its employees. "

       Held (allowing the appeal): (1) The Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that it had jurisdiction to impose conditions as a prerequisite for granting permission to the company to retrench its workmen.

       (2) The object of S. 22 of the 1950 Act like that of S. 33 of the 1947 Act as amended is to protect the workmen concerned in disputes which form the subject-matter of pending proceedings against victimisation by the employer on account of their having raised industrial disputes or their continuing the pending proceedings. It is further the object of the two sections to ensure that proceedings in connection with industrial disputes already pending should be brought to a termination in a peaceful atmosphere and that no employer should during the pendency of those proceedings take any action of the kind mentioned in the sections which may give rise to fresh disputes likely to further exacerbate the already strained relation between the employer and the workmen.

       To achieve this object a ban has been imposed on the ordinary right which the employer has under the ordinary law governing a contract of employment. Section 22 of the 1950 Act and S. 33 of the 1947 Act which impose the ban also provide for the removal of that ban by the granting of express permission in writing in appropriate cases by the authority mentioned therein. The purpose of these two sections being to determine whether the ban: should be removed or not, all that is required of the authority exercising jurisdiction under these sections is to accord or withhold permission.1

       (3) Section 29 of the Act provides for penalty for contravention -of the provisions of section 22, namely, imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Four things are to be noted, namely, (i) that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal is appellate; (ii) that section 22 of Act confers on the appellate tribunal a special jurisdiction which is in the nature of original jurisdiction; (iii) that section 23

       1. Carlsbad Mineral Water Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1953) 1 Lab. L.J. 85.

       also vests in the tribunal an additional jurisdiction to decide the complaints as if it were an appeal pending before it; and (iv) that section 23 confers on the workmen an additional amenity which they did not have under the 1947 Act.

       (4) The scope and ambit of the jurisdiction conferred on the authority named in section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act is wider than that conferred on the Criminal Court of section 31 of 1947 Act and section 29 of the 1950 Act. The Criminal Court under the two last mentioned sections is only concerned with the first issue namely, yea or nay whether there has been a contravention of the respective provisions of the sections mentioned therein, but the authority exercising jurisdiction under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act is to adjudicate upon or decide the complaint" as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it" in the first case or "as if it were an appeal pending before it" in the second case. The authority is, therefore, enjoined to go into the merits of the act complained under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act. In the sense the jurisdiction of the authority named in these two sections is certainly wider than that of the Criminal Court exercising jurisdiction under the penal sections referred to above. Having regard to the secope of the enquiry under section 33-A -of the Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act it must follow that the power of the authority to grant relief must be co-extensive with its power to grant relief on a reference made to it or an appeal brought before it, as the case may be.

       It follows that the authority referred to in these sections must have jurisdiction to do complete justice between the parties relating to the matters in dispute and must have power to give such relief as the nature of the case may require, and as is also indicated by the prior clause mentioned in the two forms DD and E. In short, these two sections give to the workmen :a direct right to approach the tribunal or appellate tribunal for the redress of their grievances without the interference of the appropriate Government which they did not possess before 1950 and they provide for speedy determination of disputes and avoid multiplicity of proceedings by giving complete relief to the workmen in relation to their grievances arising out of the action taken by the employer in contravention of the provisions of the relevant sections.

       (5) The provisions of the two new sections 33 and 33-A of the 1947 Act correspond to and are "in pari materia" with the provisions of sections 22 and 23 of the 1950 Act and are more or less in similar terms.