Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
18th April 1958
B.P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.
Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan (in C. A. No. 287 of 1955); The State of Bombay (in C. A. No. 288 of 1955)-Appellants
Versus
Ram Krishna Govind Bhanu and others-Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 287 and 288 of 1955.
Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Senior Advocate, M./s G. A. Desai and Naunit Lal, Advocates with him, for Appellants (in C. A. No. 287 of 1955) and Respondent No. 6 (in C. A. No. 288 of 1955); Mr. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General or India, M/s. K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, Advocates, with him, for Appellant (in C. A. No. 288 of 1955) and Respondent No. 2 (in C. A. No. 287 of 1955), Mr. Purshotam Tricumdas, Senior Advocate, M./s. J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andely and Rameshwar Nath, Advocates of M./s. Rajinder Narain & Co., for Respondent No. (in both the appeals).
LIMITATION ACT - SECTION 14 - GOOD FAITH - DUE DILIGENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF - SUIT FOR POSSESSION - DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION - RE-PRESENTATION IN COURT OF HIGHER JURISDICTION - LIMITATION.
Fact of the Case:
Plaintiff filed a suit for possession and mesne profits in respect of lands resumed by the State of Miraj in 1910. The suit was filed on the last day of limitation in the Munsiff's Court, which lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. After 10 years, the plaintiff applied to have the plaint returned and re-presented it in the District Court. The District Court dismissed the suit as barred by limitation. The High Court reversed the decision and decreed the suit.
Finding of the Court:
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the exclusion of time spent prosecuting a previous suit in good faith and with due diligence. The Court found that the plaintiff had not shown that he had been prosecuting the previous suit with due diligence or that it had been prosecuted in good faith. The Court also held that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiff to satisfy the conditions of Section 14 and that the burden did not shift to the defendant to show the contrary.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 2. Whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 14 of the Limitation Act requires the plaintiff to show that he had been prosecuting the previous suit with due diligence and in good faith. The plaintiff had not adduced any evidence to show that he had been prosecuting the previous suit with due diligence. The plaintiff had not brought on the record of the case any evidence to show that he was prosecuting the previously instituted suit with "due diligence" as required by S. 14. He has not adduced in evidence the order-sheet or some equivalent evidence of the proceedings in the Sub-Judge s court at Miraj, to show that in spite of his due diligence, the suit remained pending for over ten years in that court, before he thought of having the suit tried by a court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction. 2. In view of the conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation under Section 14, it was not necessary to pronounce upon the other contention raised on behalf of the appellants that, even after giving the benefit of S. 14, the suit is still barred under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act.
Final Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the suit was dismissed with costs throughout.
Judgment
B. P. SINHA, J. : These two appeals are directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th November 1951, passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, reversing those of the District Judge at Miraj, dismissing the plaintiff s suit for possession and mesne profits in respect of the suit properties in Civil Suit No. 2 of 1940. Civil Appeal No. 287 of 1955, is on behalf of the added respondent No. 7, and the Civil Appeal No. 288 of 1955, is on behalf of the added respondent No. 6- the State of Bombay which now represents the original first defendant-the Miraj State (now merged in the State of Bombay.)
2. In the view we have taken, as will presently appear, on the question of limitation, it is not necessary to state in any detail the pleadings of the parties or the merits of the decisions of the Courts below. For the purposes of these appeals, it is only necessary to state that the plaintiff-respondent who was the appellant in the High Court, had instituted a suit on 31st January 1929, the very last day of limitation, in the Munsiff s Court at Miraj. This suit was registered as Original Suit No. 724 of 1930, in that Court. The plaintiff prayed in the plaint for possession and mesne profits in respects of lands at Malgaon and Takli, on the ground that the then State of Miraj had wrongfully resumed those lands in 1910, as part of the State Sheri Khata, which, after inquiry, was ordered on 31st July 1915, to be recorded as such lands, the usufruct thereof during that period to be appropriated to the Khasgi Khata of the State. The plaintiff impleaded the State of Miraj as the first defendant. Defendants 2 and 3 are plaintiff s brothers who are said to have relinquished their interest in the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant 4 to 7 belong to the family of Narso who was, until his death in 1910, recorded in respect of the suit properties, but they did not appear and contest the plaintiff s claim. The suit was valued at Rs. 2,065/-, being 5 times the assessment on the disputed lands for the purposes of court-fee. No valuation was given in the plaint for the purposes of jurisdiction with reference to the value of the properties claimed. A similar suit had been instituted by the plaintiff in the same Court in respect of lands in another village called Tikoni. That had been registered as Original Suit No. 443 of 1928 in the Munsiff s Court at Miraj, and we shall refer to that suit as the "Tikoni suit . It appears that the two suits proceeded in that Court in a very leisurely fashion until 29th November 1939, when the Tikoni suit was dismissed. After the dismissal of that suit, the plaintiff made an application on 21st June, 1940, drawing the attention of the Court to the fact that the value of the subject-matter of the suit had not been mentioned in the plaint, and that, on a moderate valuation, the disputed land should not be worth "less than a minimum of 8 to 10 thousand rupees", and that, therefore, the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the suit. The Court allowed the application and directed the plaint to be returned to be presented to the proper Court, on 4th July 1940. The plaint was accordingly re-presented on that very date to the Court of District Judge at Miraj, and the same was numbered as Suit No. 2 of 1940.
3. The original first defendant only contested the suit on a number of grounds including the plea of limitation. By a petition dated 27th October 1942, the defendant brought it to the notice of the Court that the "plaintiff despite his knowledge that the value of the subject-matter of the suit was far in excess of the amount of jurisdiction of the Munsiff s Court filed the suit in the said Court. The said act of the plaintiff was not at all bona fide .... The facilities as regards limitations etc. which a bona fide suitor would be entitled to cannot, therefore, be afforded to the plaintiff."
4. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, the larding Dist
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
