1. Agricultural income tax assessment quashed under Article 226 — Subsequent retrospective validation by statute — Application for review of High Court order dismissed. (Para 2 )
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1962 Supreme(SC) 115
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
March, 1962.
B.P. SINHA, C.J.I., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR AND T.L. VENKATARAMA AYYAR, JJ.
State of U.P. and others, Appellants
Versus
Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1961.
Advocates appeared
Mr. C. B. Aggarwala, Senior Advocate, (Mr. C. P. Lal, Advocate, with him), for Appellants; Mr. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of India (M/s. S. K Kapur, Bishambar Lal and K. K Jain, advocates, with him), for Respondent.
Advocates:
Bishambar Lal Khanna, C.B.AGARWAL, C.P.LAL, H.N.SANYAL, K.K.JAIN, S.K.KAPOOR
Bishambar Lal Khanna, C.B.AGARWAL, C.P.LAL, H.N.SANYAL, K.K.JAIN, S.K.KAPOOR
The judgment analyzes whether an order refusing a review application constitutes a 'judgment' under Letters Patent, contrasting the requirement of determining merits against the requirement of terminating the proceedings in the court.
Headnote:(A) Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1949; Validating Act, 1956; Constitution of India, Art. 226; Rules of Court, Ch. VIII R. 5; Letters Patent, Cl. 10 and 15; Code of Civil Procedure, Order 47.
(B) Definition of "judgment" for the purpose of appeal under Letters Patent - There is a cleavage of opinion among various High Courts. One view is that "judgment" means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability (Para 4). Another view is that the test is whether the effect of the adjudication, regardless of form, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the court is concerned (Para 4).
Facts of the case:
An assessment of agricultural income tax was quashed by a single judge of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, a validating Act was enacted to retrospectively validate such assessments and allow for a review of orders set aside on jurisdictional grounds. An application for review was filed but dismissed by the single judge on the ground that the statutory provision did not entitle the applicant to review an order made under Art. 226. A division bench dismissed the appeal, holding that an order refusing a review application is not a "judgment" and affirming the single judge's construction of the statutory provision.
Findings of Court:
The court examined the scope of the expression "judgment" under the Letters Patent, noting that some courts require the decision to affect the merits, while others consider whether the order terminates the proceedings in that particular court (Para 4).
Issues: (1) Whether an order rejecting an application for review constitutes a "judgment" under the Rules of Court, thereby making it subject to appeal to a division bench. (2) Whether the provisions of a validating Act for review of assessments include orders passed by a High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. (3) Whether a review application filed under a statutory provision can be treated as one filed under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ratio Decidendi: The court analyzed the conflict between the "merits" test and the "termination" test for defining "judgment" under Letters Patent, observing that the latter test considers an adjudication a judgment if its effect is to put an end to the proceeding in the court where it is pending (Para 4).
Result: Not provided in the text.
Judgement Key Points
- The appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a division Bench of the Allahabad High Court confirming the dismissal of the appellants' application to review an order dated November 22, 1958. (!)
- The respondent held zamindari and agricultural properties and was assessed to agricultural income-tax by the Additional Collector, Banaras, for the year 1359 fasli. (!)
- The respondent filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the assessment order on the ground that the Additional Collector had no jurisdiction. (!)
- The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the assessment, and the State of Uttar Pradesh did not prefer an appeal, allowing the order to become final. (!)
- The State of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance (later replaced by U.P. Act XIV of 1956) which retrospectively validated the assessments and conferred a right to apply for review within 90 days of the Ordinance's commencement. (!)
- The appellants filed an application for review pursuant to Section 6 of the Ordinance (Section 11 of the Act) in the High Court at Allahabad. (!)
- The High Court judge, Mehrotra, J., held that Section 11 of the Act did not entitle the appellants to file an application for review of an order made by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. (!)
- The appellants appealed to a division Bench, which dismissed the appeal on two grounds: first, that an order refusing an application for review is not a "judgment" under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court; second, that Section 11 of the Act does not cover such an order. (!)
- The Supreme Court is addressing the first question: whether an appeal lies against the order of Mehrotra, J. rejecting the application for review to a division Bench under Chapter VIII Rule 5, which requires the order to amount to a "judgment." (!)
- The definition of "judgment" in the context of Letters Patent clauses varies among High Courts, with Calcutta viewing it as a decision affecting merits or determining some right or liability, while Madras views it as any adjudication that puts an end to the suit or proceeding. (!) (!) (!) (!)
- The Calcutta High Court held that an order refusing to set aside an order granting leave to sue is a judgment because it determines the right to sue and affects jurisdiction. (!) (!)
- The Madras High Court held that an order refusing to frame an issue is not a judgment, emphasizing that the test is the effect of the adjudication on the suit or proceeding. (!)
- The Madras High Court further clarified that a decision determining the cause or proceeding so far as the court is concerned, even if it refuses to adjudge the merits, must be deemed a judgment. (!)
- The Allahabad High Court expressed the view that an order not appealable under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable. (!)
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether order refusing review is a judgment for appeal purposes — Whether statutory review provisions apply to Article 226 orders — Whether review is maintainable under Order 47 CPC. (Para 3 )
3. Analysis of the term judgment under Letters Patent — Comparison of divergent High Court interpretations regarding whether an order must determine merits or end the proceeding to be appealable. (Para 4 )
4. How have different High Courts interpreted the term judgment for the purpose of Letters Patent appeals?
The Calcutta High Court views it as a decision affecting merits by determining a right or liability. Conversely, the Madras High Court tests whether the order's effect is to end the suit or proceeding. (Para 4 )
Judgment
SUBBA RAO, J. (For himself, Sinha, C.J.I. and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Venkatarama Aiyar JJ.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of a division Bench of the Allahabad High Court confirming those of a single Judge of that court dismissing the application filed by the appellants to review the order of the High Court dated November 22, 1958.
2. The facts leading up to the filing of this appeal may be briefly stated. The respondent held certain zamindari and agricultural properties in different districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh. On December 22, 1952, the Additional Collector, Banaras, in exercise of the powers conferred on him under the provisions of the U. P. Agricultural Income-tax Act (Act III of 1949), assessed the respondent to an agricultural Income-tax of Rs. 99,964-12-0 for the year 1359 fasli. On September 30, 1955, the respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the said order on the ground that the Additional Collector, Banaras, had no jurisdiction to make the said assessment. On November 22, 1955, Mehrotra, J., allowed the writ petition quashing the said assessment. The State of Uttar Pradesh did not prefer an appeal against the said order and allowed it to become final. On February 9, 1956, the State of Uttar Pradesh promulgated an Ordinance, being Ordinance No. II of 1956, which was subsequently replaced by U.P. Act XIV of 1956. Under the provisions of the Ordinance, the assessments made by the Additional Collector were retrospectively validated and, under S. 6 thereof, a right was conferred upon any party to the proceedings under the U. P. Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948,(hereinafter called the Principal Act), wherein any assessment made by an Additional Collector or Additional Assistant Collector was set aside merely on the ground that the assessing authority had no jurisdiction to make the assessment, to apply within 90 days from the date of the commencement of the said Ordinance for a review of the said proceedings in the light of the provisions of the Ordinance, and a statutory injunction was imposed upon a court to review the said order accordingly. Pursuant to the provisions of S.6 of the said Ordinance on March 14, 1956 the appellants filed an application in the High Court at Allahabad for review of its order dated November 22, 1956. Subsequently as stated earlier, the Ordinance was replaced by the U.P. Act XIV of 1956, hereinafter called the Act. In the course of the judgment we shall refer only to the provisions of the Act. The said application was heard, in the first instance, by Mehrotra, J., and he held that S. 11 of the Act, which corresponds to S. 6 of the Ordinance, did not entitle the appellants to file an application for review of an order made by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appellant s petition was dismissed on that ground. The appellants preferred an appeal against the said order to a division Bench of that court. Mootham, C. J., and Srivastava, J., who heard the appeal, dismissed it on two grounds, namely, (1) under Ch. VIII R. 5 of the Rules of Court, a special appeal against an order of a single judge of the court can be maintained only if that order amounts to a "judgment", and an order refusing an application for review not being a "judgment" cannot be the subject of an appeal. (2) on merits, that is on the construction of S. 11 of the Act the view taken by Mehrotra, J. was correct. The present appeal as already stated, was preferred against the said order.
3. Mr. C. B. Aggarwala, learned counsel for the appellants, has raised before us the following points: (1) The order of Mehrotra, J., dismissing the application for review of his earlier order is a "judgment" within the meaning of Ch. VIII R. 5 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, an appeal lies against that order to a division Bench of that Court. (2) The terms of S. 11 of the Act are comprehensive enough
