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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
9th October, 1963
P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH AND RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.
Syed Yakoob, Appellant
Versus
K. S. Radhakrishnan and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 593 of 1963.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. C. Setalvad, Senior Advocate, (Mr. R. Gopalkrishnan, Advocate with him), for Appellant; Mr. G. S. Pathak, Senior Advocate, (M/s. O. C. Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, Advocates of M/s J. B. Dadachanji and Co. with him), for Respondent No. 1 Mr. A. Rangandham Chetty, Senior Advocate, (Mr. A. V. Rangam, Advocate, with him), for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
-held, their position is that of Court and they are not interested on merit of dispute in any sense. Their representation by lawyers is wholly unnecessary and even inappropriate.
The jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and does not extend to acting as an appellate authority over findings of fact reached by an inferior tribunal after appreciation of evidence. (!) [1000118980005][1000118980006]
A writ of certiorari may issue to correct jurisdictional errors, such as orders passed without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or failure to exercise jurisdiction, or where the tribunal acts illegally or violates natural justice principles. [1000118980006]
Findings of fact by a tribunal cannot be challenged in certiorari proceedings merely on grounds of insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence; such matters fall within the tribunal's exclusive domain. [1000118980006]
A writ may correct an error of law apparent on the face of the record, such as obvious misinterpretation of a statutory provision, ignorance or disregard of it, or conclusions plainly inconsistent with the law, but not errors requiring argument to discover or mere errors of fact. [1000118980006][1000118980007]
Where a tribunal's finding of fact is based on no evidence, erroneously excludes material evidence, or admits inadmissible evidence influencing the finding, it may amount to an error of law correctable by certiorari. [1000118980006]
In evaluating workshop facilities for permit grants under motor vehicles legislation, a tribunal's preference for an applicant with facilities at a route terminus over one with facilities midway does not constitute an irrelevant consideration. [1000118980008][1000118980013]
Failure by a tribunal to expressly reference or reason every piece of evidence does not, by itself, justify certiorari if the finding is supported by other record evidence, such as official reports contradicting a claimant's assertion. [1000118980008][1000118980009][1000118980010][1000118980011][1000118980012]
Official transport reports indicating workshop locations, when contradicting a claimant's self-assertion, provide evidentiary basis for a tribunal's factual finding, precluding High Court interference under Article 226. [1000118980010][1000118980011][1000118980024]
Article 136 jurisdiction is discretionary and may be declined where interests of justice so dictate, but not where a High Court order lacks jurisdiction, as substituting appellate review for tribunal fact-finding undermines the supervisory role. [1000118980005][1000118980015]
Tribunals and authorities are necessary parties to writ or appeal proceedings challenging their orders but need not be represented by counsel absent specific allegations requiring reply, as they hold a neutral position akin to courts. [1000118980018]
Writ orders should be precisely drafted to avoid technically setting aside unchallenged portions of tribunal decisions, such as permits granted to unrelated parties. [1000118980016]
Judgment
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. (For himself and for Wanchoo, Shah and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.) The short question which this appeal raises for our decision relates to the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in issuing a writ of certiorari while dealing with orders passed by the appropriate authorities granting or refusing to grant permits under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called the Act ).
2. The State Transport Authority, Madras, (hereinafter referred to as Authority) issued a notification on July 4, 1956 under S. 57(2) of the Act calling for applications for the grant of two stage carriage permits to run as an express service on the route Madras to Chidambaram. 107 applications were received in response to the said notification: some of these were rejected as time barred or otherwise defective, and the others which were in order were examined by the Authority.
3. On May, 8, 1957, the Authority found that Provincial Transport (Private) Ltd., Madras, was the most suitable amongst the applicants and granted one permit to it. As regards the second permit, the authority held that none of the other applicants was suitable, and so, it refused to grant the said permit to anyone of them; it decided to call for applications afresh under S. 57(2) of the Act.
4. Against this order, appeals were preferred by 18 claimants for permits before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called "the Appellate Tribunal ); amongst them was the appellant Syed Yakoob and respondent No,. 1 K. S. Radhakrishnan. The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the grant of the first permit to the Provincial Transport (Pvt.) Ltd., and so far as the second permit was concerned, it allowed the appeal preferred by the appellant and directed that the said second permit should be issued to him; respondent No. 1 s claim for the said permit was accordingly rejected. This order was passed on July 7, 1958.
5. The validity of this order was challenged by respondent No. 1 by his writ petition No.1 by his writ petition No. 44 of 1959 filed in the High Court of Madras. Srinivasan J. who heard the writ petition held that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in deciding the question of the grant of the second permit and allowed considerations not germane to the question to vitiate its order. That is why the rule issued on the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 was made absolute.
6. This order was challenged by the appellant before a Division Bench of the said High Court by an appeal preferred under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench has held that the order passed by Srinivasan J., could be sustained on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal had overlooked material considerations in favour of respondent No. 1, and so, it has affirmed the decision of the learned single Judge on that ground alone. In regard to the finding of the learned single Judge that an irrelevant consideration had vitiated the finding of the Appellate Tribunal the Division Bench held that the consideration in question was not irrelevant, and so, it differed from the view taken by Srinivasan J. In the result, the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Division Bench was dismissed. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave and to his appeal he has impleaded respondent No. 1 and has added the Authority and the Appellate Tribunal as respondents 2 and 3. Mr. Setalvad for the appellant contends that in issuing a writ of certiorari in respect of the impugned order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion, this contention is well-founded and must be accepted.
7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certior
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