S. 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a special procedure for prosecuting witnesses who give false evidence or fabricate false evidence in a judicial proceeding.

Judgment

HIDAYATULLAH, J. : This is an appeal under S. 476-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure by one Baban Singh and his wife Dharichhan Kuer against a judgment and order of the High Court at Patna ordering the Registrar to file a complaint against them under S. 199 of the Indian Penal Code for making false affidavits. The respondents are persons who had moved the High Court under S. 476 of the Code for the prosecution of the appellants in the following circumstances.

2. Jagdish Singh and Parmhans were appellants in F. A. 301 of 1952 in the High Court at Patna. Mst. Dharichhan Kuer was respondent No. 13 in that appeal. During the pendency of the appeal a compromise was said to have been arrived at between Dharichhan Kuer on the one hand and Jagdish Singh and Parmhans on the other. Dharichhan Kuer and Jagdish Singh swore an affidavit on June 22, 1953 in support of the petition for compromise which was filed in the High Court. Baban Singh s brother identified Dharichhan Kuer before the Oath Commissioner and Rs 4,000 were paid to Dharichhan Kuer under the terms of the compromise in the Commissioner s presence. Dharichhan Kuer also passed a receipt and her thumb impression was identified by Baban Singh s brother. The petition of compromise was filed in Court on July 13, 1953. The same day Baban Singh swore an affidavit (Ex. B) denying the compromise or that his wife had received Rs. 4,000. This affidavit was filed in the High Court on July 31, 1953. On September 9, 1953 Dharichhan Kuer also filed an affidavit (Ex. A) in support of her husband.

3. As the compromise was in dispute the High Court ordered the Registrar to hold an enquiry. Nine witnesses were examined on behalf of Jagdish Singh and Parmhans including the Oath Commissioner. Dharichhan Kuer and her husband Baban Singh gave evidence on their own behalf. The Registrar reported on July 14, 1954 that the compromise was genuine and that Dharichhan Kuer had, in fact., sworn the affidavit before the Oath Commissioner and had received Rs. 4,000. B. N Rai and Kanhaiya Singh, JJ. accepted the report by their order dated October 5. 1956. One of the terms of the compromise was that if Dharichhan Kuer resiled from it the amount of Rs. 4 000 would be refunded with costs - Rs. 500. Dharichhan Kuer deposited this amount in Court on October 9, 1956. The first appeal was then heard and disposed of.

4. The application under S. 476 out of which this appeal has arisen was filed during the pendency of the first appeal and was taken up for hearing after the appeal was disposed of. A question arose whether a complaint for prosecution of Baban Singh and Dharichhan Kuer for an offence under S. 193, Indian Penal Code could be filed in the High Court because Baban Singh and Dharichhan Kuer had deposed not before the Court but before the Registrar. Further S. 479A (to which we shall refer presently) was introduced from January 1, 1956 and thus on October .5 1956. when the High Court accepted the report of the Registrar, it was in force. The Divisional Bench did not consider taking action under S. 193 because of S. 479A and it appears that the counsel for Jagdish Singh and Parmhans also conceded that no prosecution could take place under that section. The High Court, however, considered whether action should be taken in respect of the two affidavits (Exs. A and B). It is not necessary to refer to the statements in these affidavits because we are not considering whether they were true or false. It was contended before the High Court that a prosecution under S. 199 of the I. P. C. would be equally covered by S. 479A and as the procedure under that section was not followed an application for prosecution under S. 476 was barred. This contention was not accepted by the High Court and after going into the expediency of the prosecution the learned Judges ordered the Registrar of the High Court to file a complaint before the appropriate authority for the prosecution of the appellants. The appellants now appeal