Judgment

HEGDE, J.: In this appeal by special leave, the scope of Section 95 (1) (g) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) arises for decision.

2. The facts material for the purpose of deciding this appeal are these: The respondent was the elected Pradhan of the Goan Sabha of Asapur District Faizabad. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Faizabad placed him under suspension as per his order of September 18, 1963. The order in question reads as follows:

"Sri Shambhoo Narain Singh, Pradhan of Gram Sabha and Chairman, Land Management Committee of village Asapur is placed under suspension with effect from the immediate date. He is further directed to hand over the charge to the Up-Pradhan of Gram Sabha, Asapur. The Up-Pradhan will function as Pradhan till further orders. The charge sheet against Sri Shambhoo Narain Singh will follow.

(Sd.) S. M. Abbas,

P.C.S.,

Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar,

Faizabad."

3. The validity of this order is being challenged in these proceedings. It is the common case of both the parties that the suspension ordered thereunder is merely a suspension pending enquiry and is not a punishment imposed under S. 95 (1) (g).The question for decision is whether the appellant had the competence to place the respondent under suspension pending enquiry into the charges levelled against the respondent. The impugned order was challenged before a single judge of the Allahabad High Court by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned single judge dismissed that petition but in appeal the appellate bench upheld the contention of the respondent and quashed the same holding that Section 95 (1) (g) did not empower the appellant to pass the impugned order .It is the correctness of that conclusion that is in issue in this appeal.

4. To repeat the respondent is an elected Pradhan. His rights and duties are regulated by the Act. He is not a Government servant though he has to be deemed as a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code in view of Section 28 of the Act. He is not a subordinate of the Sub-Divisional Officer or even of the Government. It is true that the Act has conferred on the State Government certain powers of control and supervision over the Gaon Sabhas and its office-bearers. These powers are enumerated in Section 95. Under Section 95 (1) (g) power is conferred on the Government to suspend or remove a member of a Gaon Panchayat or joint committee (Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti) or an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha or a Panch, Sahyak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. But that power is admittedly a power to punish. No specific power to suspend a Pradhan pending enquiry into the charges levelled against him has been conferred on the State Government. This much is conceded. In view of Section 96A the power conferred on the Government under Section 95 can be delegated to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to such conditions and restrictions as the Government may deem fit to impose, The State Government s power under Section 95 (1) (g) has been delegated to Sub-Divisional Officers. Therefore if the State Government is held to have power to suspend an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha pending enquiry into the charges levelled against him that power must be held to have been delegated to the Sub-Divisional Officers. Therefore the essential question is whether the State Government has power to make the impugned order.

5. A faint attempt was made to show that the relationship between the State Government and the Pradhans is that of master and servants and that being so the State Government has competence to require Pradhans not to discharge their functions as Pradhans during the pendency of an enquiry into the charges made against them. It was urged that if the court is pleased to hold that the relationship between the State Government and the Pradhans is that of a master