19. Sub-section (5) of S. 132 does not contemplate a different procedure in the matter of regular assessment. See Section 132A which shows that those who are found in possession of undisclosed income on a seizure are liable to be regularly assessed or reassessed. Sub-section (5) only contemplates a provisional summary enquiry with a view to determine how much of the seized wealth can be legitimately and reasonably retained to cover the tax liability already incurred. Regular assessment follows under the law in the same manner as in the case of tax evaders who are not found in possession of concealed income. The utmost that can be said is that by reason of the seizure the Government is in a position to secure its tax dues before the regular assessment is concluded. But that does not introduce any different procedure for the regular assessment of such an assessees income which remains the same for all tax evaders. In one set of cases the fiscal authorities make sure of recoveries, in the other, they are unable to do so - not because the provisions of Section 132 do not operate on them, but because action under that section by search and seizure is futile. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that two different procedures for assessment are adopted and hence there is a discrimination under Article 14. The plea on behalf of the assessees, in effect, only amount to this "It is true that we are tax evaders. But if other 360 evaders successfully dodge the collection of the tax by causing their concealed income to disappear why should we not get the same facility?"

20. Some points of lesser substance were mentioned in the petition memos in support of the challenge under Articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g) They were, however, not urged at the time of the hearing as on the other grounds urged, it was impossible to hold that the impugned provisions were violative of either Articles 14, 19 or 31. We may, however, mention in this context that theses points had been raised in C Venkata Reddy v. Income-tax Officer (Central) 1. Bangalore, 66 ITR 212 and in Ramjibahi Kalidas v. I. G. Desai .(1971) 80 ITR 721 (Guj.) where they have been quite adequately dealt with and rejected.

21. Apart from constitutional challenge there was also a further challenge on the ground that the actual search and seizure in all these cases. Being in contravention of the requirements of Section 132 and R. 112 was illegal. Several allegations have been made of mala fides, high-handedness, oppressive behaviour and the like we shall have to deal with them on the facts of each case. But so far as the two Civil Appeals are concerned, it appears to us that it is not necessary to enter into the question of the alleged illegalities. The High Court has not done so. The relief claimed in those petitions in the High Court was for the return of the account books and documents which had been seized and it would appear from the record that before the High Court disposed of that matter, the account books and documents had been already returned. However, there was another relief claimed in the petitions and that was for a Writ of Prohibition restraining the Income-tax Department from using as evidence any information gathered from the search of the articles seized. It would appear from the record that the High Court was prepared to assume for the purposes of those cases that the search and seizure was illegal. Even so the question remained whether these victims of illegal search were entitled to a Writ of Prohibition that the Incom-tax authorities shall not use any information gathered from the documents which had been seized. The High Court held that they were not, and proceeded to pass the following identical order in the two cases. It is as follows:

"In this case all the documents seized in pursuance of the search warrant have been returned to the petitioners and the only question is whether the information gathered as a result of such search and seizure could be used i