JUDGMENT

KRISHNA IYER, J.:—The appellant employer, undaunted by a double defeat at both tiers in the High Court, has appealed against the adverse judgments, by certificate, on the only ground that there was no retrenchment of the respondent-employee within the meaning of S.2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act) and, consequently, the latter was ineligible to the statutory compensation the non-payment of which, along with the termination of service, nullified the termination itself. The end result was that the Division Bench of the Court ruled that the respondent was entitled to retrenchment compensation which, not having been paid, the termination would be invalid . The subtle legal issue, substantial in its financial impact, is whether Sec. 25F read with Section 2 (oo), vis a vis a short employment casts a lethal spell on the cessation of service for non-compliance with the condition precedent set out in the provision.

The Certificate.

2. The certificate issued by the High Court under Art. 133 (1) is bad on its face, according to counsel for the respondent and the appeal consequently incompetent. We are inclined to agree that the grant of a constitutional passport to the SC by the High Court is not a matter of easy insouciance but anxious advertence to the dual vital requirements built into Art. 133 (1) by specific amendment. Failure here stultifies the scheme of the Article and floods this Court with cases of lesser magnitude with illegitimate entry. A substantial question of law of general importance is a sine qua non to certify fitness for hearing by the apex court. Nay, more; the question however important and substantial, must be of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the High Court s judgment it imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highest bench. The crux of the matter has been correctly set out in a decision Union of India v. Hafiz Mohd. Said: ILR (1973) 2 Delhi 673, 676 of the Delhi High Court in words which find our approval:

"A certificate can be granted only if the case involves a question of law:-

(i) which is not only substantial but is also of general importance; and

(ii) the said question, in our opinion, needs to be decided by the SC.

It has to be noted that all the above requirements should be satisfied before a certificate can be granted. It means that it is not sufficient if the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance but in addition to it the High Court should be of the opinion that such question needs to be decided by the SC. Further, the word needs suggests that there has to be a necessity for a decision by the SC on the question, and such a necessity can be said to exist when, for instance, two views are possible regarding the question and High Court takes one of the said views. Such a necessity can also said to exist when a different view has been expressed by another High Court.

3. It is but fair to add an implied but important foot-note that while exercising the wider power under Art. 136 this Court must have due regard to the constitutional limitations on Art. 133 (1) and owe allegiance to those restraints save in exceptional cases.

4. This view of the certificate would have put the lid on this appeal but on hearing counsel we feel that the omission of the High Court to assess the case explicity from this angle does not disable us from granting special leave, if applied for. So much so counsel have proceeded to argue on the merits, penumbral area of industrial law covered by the subject-matter being one which cannot be left in legal twilight. 1113

The facts

5. One of the two employees involved in these appeals has been reabsorbed in service and his case is therefore of lesser import, but the other is still out in the cold and his legal fate falls for examination in the matrix of facts which we proceed to state. The respondent was appointed off and on, by the State Bank of India between J