Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy vs V. Narayana Reddy

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1976 Supreme(SC) 213

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. SARKARIA, P.N. SHINGHAL AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.
Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and others, Appellants

Versus

V. Narayana Reddy and others, Respondents.
Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1975

Decided on 4-5-1976.
Advocates appeared
Mr. P. Basi Reddy, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. A. V. V. Nair, Advocate with him), for Appellants; Mr. M. R. K. Chaudhury, and Mr. B. Kanta Rao, Advocates (for No. 1); Mr. P. Ram Reddy, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. P. Parameshwara Rao, Advocate with him), for Nos. 2 and 3, for Respondents.

Advocates:
A.V.Velayudhan Nair, B.Kanta Rao, M.R.K.CHOUDHARY, P.Basi Reddy, P.PARMESHVARAN, P.RAM REDDY

Headnote:
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 202 (1), 156 (3), 482 and 156 (3) - Indian Penal Code,1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 395, 448, 307 , 395 , 378 and 342 of the 1674 - New Code - Section 202 - Account of factions - Unlawful assembly - Respondent 1 herein made a complaint account of factions existing in village Thippapalli the appellants formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons, such as axes, spears and sticks, on the night entered houses of several persons belonging to the opposite party, attacked the inmates and forcibly took away jewels, paddy, ground-nuts and other valuables of the total value of two lakhs of rupees - It was further alleged that the miscreants thereafter went to the fields and removed parts of machinery worth installed at the wells of their enemies. On these facts it was alleged that the accused had committed offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 395, 448, 378 and 342 of the 1674 Penal Code – Held, ground for proceeding; but only for ordering an investigation under Section - He did not bring into motion the machinery of Chapter XV. He did not examine complainant or his witnesses under Section 200, Cr. P. C., which is the first step in the procedure prescribed under that Chapter - Question of taking the next step of the procedure envisaged in Section 202 did not arise. Instead of taking cognizance of the offence, he has, in exercise of his discretion, sent the complaint for investigation by police under S. 156 - case to express any final on the ambit and scope of the 1st Proviso to Section 202 (1) of the Code of 1973. Suffice it to say stage at which Sec. 202 could become operative was never reached in this case – Court have therefore in keeping with the well established practice of the Court, decided only that much which was essential for the disposal of this appeal - Appeal dismissed

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized:

The case concerns the scope of a Magistrate's authority to direct police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) when a complaint discloses an offence that is exclusively triable by a Court of Session (!) .
The core issue is whether a Magistrate receiving such a complaint is barred from sending it for police investigation under Section 156(3) due to the restriction imposed by the first Proviso to Section 202(1) of the CrPC, which prohibits investigation if the offence is triable exclusively by a Court of Session (!) .
The new Code (1973) introduced changes that distinguish between the stages of initiating a case—specifically, the difference between taking cognizance and merely forwarding a complaint for investigation (!) (!) .
The power under Section 156(3) is exercisable at a pre-cognizance stage, before the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, whereas Section 202 applies after the Magistrate has taken cognizance and is dealing with the case under Chapter XV (!) (!) .
The exercise of power under Section 156(3) does not amount to taking cognizance of the offence; therefore, it remains permissible even if the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, provided the Magistrate has not yet taken cognizance (!) (!) .
The decision to send a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) does not automatically invoke the restrictions of Section 202(1) and its first Proviso, unless the Magistrate has already applied his mind to the case and taken cognizance (!) (!) .
The stage at which Section 202 becomes operative is only after the Magistrate has examined the complainant and witnesses under Section 200 and has formed an opinion on the prima facie nature of the offence, which was not done in this case (!) (!) .
The Court clarified that in the case at hand, the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for the purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding, but only ordered an investigation under Section 156(3). Therefore, the restriction in the first Proviso to Section 202(1) was not applicable (!) .
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming that a Magistrate can direct police investigation under Section 156(3) without being barred by the provisions of Section 202(1) when the Magistrate has not yet taken cognizance of the offence (!) .
Overall, the legal principles emphasize the distinction between initiating a case and ordering an investigation, clarifying that the restriction on investigation for offences exclusively triable by a Court of Session applies only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance, which was not the case here (!) (!) .

Please let me know if you need a more detailed analysis or specific legal advice related to this case.

JUDGMENT

SARKARIA, J.:— Whether in view of Clause (a) of the first Proviso to Section 202 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a Magistrate who receives a complaint, disclosing an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, is debarred from sending the same to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code, is the short question that falls to be determined in this appeal by special leave. The question arises in these circumstances:

2. Respondent 1 herein made a complaint on July 26, 1975 before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dharmavaram against the appellants herein alleging that on account of factions existing in village Thippapalli the appellants formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons, such as axes, spears and sticks, on the night of June 20, 1975 and entered the houses of several persons belonging to the opposite party, attacked the inmates and forcibly took away jewels, paddy, ground-nuts and other valuables of the total value of two lakhs of rupees. It was further alleged that the miscreants thereafter went to the fields and removed parts of machinery worth over Rs. 40,000/-, installed at the wells of their enemies. On these facts it was alleged that the accused had committed offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 395, 448, 378 and 342 of the 1674 Penal Code. The offences under Sections 307 and 395 are exclusively triable by the Court of Session. The Magistrate on receiving the complaint forwarded it to the Police for investigation with this endorsement:

"Forwarded under Sec. 156 (3), Cr. Procedure Code to the Inspector of Police, Dharmavaram for investigation and report on or before 5-8-1975."

3. The appellants moved the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (which corresponds to Sec. 561-A of the old Code) praying that the order passed by the Magistrate be quashed inasmuch as "it was illegal, unjust and gravely prejudicial to the petitioners." The learned Judge of the High Court, who heard the petition, dismissed it by an order dated, October 20, 1975.

4. Hence this appeal.

5. Mr. Bassi Reddy, appearing for the appellants contends that the High Court has failed to appreciate the true effect of the changes wrought by the Code of 1973. according to the Counsel, under the new Code, if a complaint discloses an offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session, the Magistrate is bound to proceed with that complaint himself before issuing process to the accuse. The point pressed into argument is that clause (a) of the first Proviso to Section 202 (1), of the new Code peremptorily prohibits the Magistrate to direct investigation of such a complaint by the Police or any other person. The cases, Gopal Das v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986; Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah, (1964) 5 SCR 37 referred to by the High Court are sought to be distinguished on the ground that they were decided under the old Code, Section 202 of which did not provide for any such ban as has been expressly enacted in the 1st Proviso to Section 202 of the new Code.

6. As against this, Mr. Rama Reddy, whose arguments have been adopted by Mr. Chaudhry, submits that the powers conferred on the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of Code are independent of his power to send the case for investigation under Section 202 of the Code; that the power under Section 156 (3) can be invoked at a stage when the Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the case, while Section 202 comes into operation after the Magistrate starts dealing with the complaint in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV. It is urged that since in the instant case, the Magistrate had sent the complaint for police investigation, without taking such cognizance Section 202 including the bar enacted therein, was not attracted. In the alternative, it is submitted that the ban in the 1st Proviso to Section 202, becomes operative only when the Magistrate after applying his mi

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1976 Supreme(SC) 213

Cases Referred (2)