JUDGMENT

CHANDRACHUD, J. : — The appellants, Munnu Raja Chhuttan, were tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Chhatarpur on the charge that at about 10 a.m. on April 30, 1969 they committed the murder of one Bhadur Singh. In support of its case, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of Santosh Singh (P. W. 1) and Mst. Gummi (P.W. 4) who claimed to be eye-witnesses and on three dying declaration alleged to have been made by the deceased. The two eye-witnesses were permitted to be cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor as they supported the case of the prosecution only partly. Santosh Singh stated that he saw Chhuttan assaulting Bhadur Singh with a spear but that he did not see Munnu Raja at all. On the other hand, Mst. Gummi stated that it was Munnu Raja and not Chhuttan who assaulted the deceased. Since the two principal witnesses turned hostile, the learned Sessions Judge thought it unsafe to rely on their testimony and, in our opinion, rightly. The learned Judge was also not impressed by any of the dying declarations with the result that he came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In that view of the matter, the appellants were acquitted by the learned Judge.

2. Being aggrieved by the order of the acquittal, the State Government filed an appeal in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which was allowed by a Division Bench of that Court by its Judgment dated September 8, 1972. The High Court did not discard the evidence of the eye-witnesses but utilised it by way of corroboration to the dying declarations alleged to have been made by the deceased. Setting aside the order of acquittal, the High Court has convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and has sentenced each of them to imprisonment for life. The appellants have filed this appeal under Section 2 (1) of the SC (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970.

3. We have heard Mr. Mohan Behari Lal on behalf of the appellants at some length and we have considered each of his submissions carefully. It is however unnecessary to discuss every one of the points made by him because, basically, the scope of this appeal - not forgetting that the appellants had a right to file this appeal in this Court - lies within a narrow compass. As we have indicated earlier, no exception can be taken to the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that it is not safe to place reliance on the testimony of Santosh Singh and Mst. Gumni. They resiled from the their police statement and it is evident that they have no regard for truth. Their evidence cannot be used to corroborate the dying declarations either.

4. We are thus left with the three dying declarations made by Bahadur Singh and since the prosecution has placed great reliance on them, we thought it necessary to hear the learned counsel fully on the facts and circumstances leading to the dying declarations.

5. In regard to these dying declarations, the judgment of the Sessions Court suffers from a patent infirmity in that it wholly overlooks the earliest of these dying declarations, which was made by the deceased soon after the incident in the house of one Barjor Singh. The second statement which has been treated by the High Court as dying declaration is Ex. P-14, being the first information report which was lodged by the deceased at the police station. The learned Sessions Judge probably assumed that since the statement was recordedas a first information report, it could not be treated as dying declaration. In this assumption, he was clearly in error. After making the statement before the police, Bahadur Singh succumbed to his injuries and therefore the statement can be treated as a dying declaration and is admissible under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. The maker of the statement is dead and the statement relates to the cause of his death.

6. The High Court has held that these statements are essentially true and do no suffer