Judgment

FAZAL ALI, J. - This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated March 5, 1980 of the Delhi High Court quashing the proceedings taken against respondents Nos. 1 to 5 and arises in the following circumstances.

2. On March 25, 1974, one Shri M. M. Gupta, Food Inspector, Municipal Corporation of Delhi visited premises No. 5171, Basant Road, Delhi where Shri Madan Lal had kept for sale Morton Toffees. The said Inspector after purchasing the sample of the article sent it to the Public Analyst who opined that the said sample did not conform to the standards prescribed for toffees. The toffees were manufactured by M/s. Upper Ganges Sugar Mills. Respondent No. 1 (Ram Kishan Rohtagi) was the Manager of the company and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were the Directors of the Company, including the company also.

3. A complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate who summoned ad the respondents for being tried for violating the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The said complaint was filed by the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi against the accused for having committed offences under Sections 7/16 of the Act.

4. The only point canvassed before us was that on the allegations made in the complaint, a clear case was made out against all the respondents and the High Court ought not to have quashed the proceedings on the ground that the complaint did not disclose any offence. Before going through the relevant part of the complaint, it may be necessary to say a few words about the law on the subject

5. After the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the present Code), there was a serious divergence of judicial opinion on the question as to whether where a power is exercised under Section 397 of the present Code, the High Court could exercise those very powers under Section 482 of the present Code. It is true that Section 397 (2) clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of interlocutory orders passed in appeal, enquiry or other proceedings. The matter is, however, no longer res integra as the entire controversy has been set at rest by a decision of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 1 SCR 749 where this Court pointed out that Section 482 of the present Code had a different parameter and was a provision independent of Section 397 (2). This Court further held that while Section 397 (2) applied to the exercise of revisional, powers of the High Court, Section 482 regulated the inherent powers of the Court to pass orders necessary in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. In this connection, Untwalia, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (para 10) :-

"On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court". But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers ... ... ... But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly."

6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code is the ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. This provision confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice has been done or where the proc