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1994 Supreme(SC) 507

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(Gujarat High Court)
Kuldip Singh, R.M. Sahai
JAY LAXMI SALT WORKS (P) LTD., APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT, RESPONDENT.
Civil Appeal No. 2482(N) of 1972
decided on May 4, 1994.

Important Points

Article 36 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is not exhaustive of all torts and applies only to malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance involving malice or bad faith. General negligence or breach of public duty falls under the residuary Article 120, providing a longer limitation period.

Subject

Tort Law - NEGLIGENCE

Act Referred

LIMITATION ACT: Art.120, Art.113, Art.36

Headnote

limitation Act, 1908 - Constitution of India - Article 36 – Claim of compensation - Compensation for damages - General public importance - Although finding of fact recorded by High Court that State was guilty of negligence has become final since the State did not challenge it by way of cross appeal or cross objection yet it appears necessary to give a brief outline of it in order to appreciate the controversy and the legal issues that arise for consideration in this appeal - In State of which now is part of State of Gujarat, made a plan for reclamation of vast area of land from water of sea by erecting a reclamation so as to prevent the sea water flowing in several creeks in the area on seaside of from flowing further to the claimed site and making the lands in that area was completed in - In very first monsoon due to change of natural course of different streams in the reclaimed area and its diversion towards the appellants factory which was existing from before led to increased flow and discharge of water on appellants land and factory – Held, limitation may be counted from that very point - It is individual or single act which by itself furnishes the cause of action - But there may be others where even though injury may have been caused but the cause of action may not arise unless something more happens - For instance if one accumulates something hazardous on its own premises and it leaks then the cause of action will arise not by accumulation or even by mere leakage but cause of damage and injury – Therefore construction of the words when and takes place used in Article 36 has to be construed liberally so as not to deprive person who suffers damages - In wrongs like negligence, strict liability or violation of public duty time begins to run not before damage takes place - But computation under article has to be from malfeasance misfeasance and non-fiancé - It has been explained earlier that the negligence or violation in such duty which results in damage could not furnish starting point - What could be the other point - Cause of action to claim damages arises when the actual loss has taken place - It is thus not the date on which negligence or mistake took place but the date when injury is suffered - But computation has to be from misfeasance or non-fiancé etc that is violation of duty - This duty has to be different than the duty which was cause of negligence - Therefore in such actions which are latent in nature the aggrieved party has to make a claim for damages and it is the failure in discharge of this duty in this regard which too can furnish starting point of limitation - Since the authorities refused to pay damages even though it was got assessed at their own direction computation of the period for filing suit could arise from that date - Otherwise it would cause great injustice - A common man, an average citizen who in a developing country cannot afford to pay huge court fee would be deprived of his just claim only because he was pursuing his remedy vigilantly in the Government of a welfare State – Appeal dismissed

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • tort
    • negligence (Para 3, 5, 11)
    • strict liability (Para 4, 8, 12)
    • state liability
      • public law duty (Para 9, 14, 15)
  • practice and procedure
    • limitation
      • limitation act, 1908 (Para 1, 13, 15, 16)

Advocates:
Anip Sachthey, E.C.AGARWAL, PURNIMA BHATT KAK, RINA AGARWAL, S.C.PATEL

Table of Contents

1. Reclamation bundh construction — Negligent planning causing flood damage to factory — Suit for damages — Dispute over applicable limitation period under Limitation Act, 1908. (Para 3 )

2. Applicability of Article 36 versus Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 — Whether negligence in public duty constitutes malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance. (Para 3 )

3. Article 36 applies to wrongs involving malice or bad faith — Negligence and failure of public duty are broader torts not limited to the specific terms of Article 36. (Para 11 , 14 , 15 )

4. Article 36 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is not exhaustive of all torts; negligence and failure of public duty without malice are governed by the residuary Article 120. (Para 15 )

5. Appeal allowed — Suit for damages decreed with interest. (Para 18 )

6. Is Article 36 of the Limitation Act, 1908, exhaustive of all torts?

No. Article 36 is not exhaustive of all torts. It applies to specific wrongs—malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance—which typically involve malice or bad faith, whereas broader torts such as negligence or failure of public duty fall under the residuary Article 120. (Para 14 , 15 )

7. What is the legal distinction between malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance under Article 36?

Malfeasance is the commission of an unlawful act; misfeasance is the improper performance of a lawful act; and non-feasance is the omission of a required duty. These expressions generally apply where the State or its officers acted with malice or bad faith. (Para 14 )

8. When does the limitation period begin to run for torts involving negligence or failure of public duty?

For latent wrongs, the limitation period begins when the actual loss occurs. Additionally, if a claim for damages is lodged and subsequently rejected by the authorities, the computation may commence from the date the claim is rejected. (Para 16 , 17 )

9. Was the rule of strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher modified by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators?

No. The court held that the rule of strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher was not modified by the decision in Modern Cultivators, which instead applied principles of fault liability to canal breaks. (Para 12 , 15 )

JUDGMENT

R. M. SAHAI, J. - This appeal by grant of certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India by the High Court of Gujarat raises substantial question of law about applicability of the period of limitation as provided in Article 36 of the limitation Act, 1908 (Ed. : Now covered by Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1963) (referred to as the Act) as it stood prior to 1963 to claim of damages founded on negligence. The High Court was of opinion that the controversy whether Article 36 could apply to rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher (LR (1868) 3 HL 330 : 37 LJ Ex 161 : [1861-73] All ER Rep 1) raises a question of general importance which required to be authoritatively decided by this Court.

2. The certificate granted by the high Court under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution was in following terms :

"The main question involved is that of limitation and whether the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (LR (1868) 3 HL 330 : 37 LJ Ex 161 : [1861-73] All ER Rep 1), would result in invoking the provisions of Article 36 of the old Limitation Act or whether Article 39 of the Act would be the appropriate Article or whether the residuary Article 121 applies and that is a substantial question of law. This point has not yet been decided by any decision of the Supreme Court directly on the point and hence is a substantial question of law which is of importance to the petitioner before us as well of general public importance and hence the certificate is granted under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution."

3. Although the finding of fact recorded by the High Court that the State was guilty of negligence has become final since the State did not challenge it by way of cross appeal or cross objection yet it appears necessary to give a brief outline of it in order to appreciate the controversy and the legal issues that arise for consideration in this appeal. In 1954 the State of Saurashtra, which now is part of State of Gujarat, made a plan for reclamation of vast area of land from saltish water of sea by erecting a reclamation bundh so as to prevent the sea water flowing in several creeks in the area on the seaside of the bundh from flowing further to the claimed site and making the lands in that area saltish. This bundh was completed in the year 1955. In the very first monsoon of 1956, due to change of natural course of different streams in the reclaimed area and its diversion towards the appellants factory which was existing from before led to increased flow and discharge of water on appellants land and factory. The appellant even before the construction of the bundh had been writing to the authorities concerned either to abandon the bundh or to change the location of weirs so as not to face the appellants factory. But this request had not been acceded to and when there was heavy downpour and the appellant found that the level in the river was rising he ran from one authority to the other requesting them to lessen the level of water and avoid increased flow near his factory with no result. By the time his running could bring forth any movement the flood level to such an extent in the night between 4th and 5th July, 1956 that water filtered to the premises of the factory breaking even the protective bundh made by the appellant on the border of its factory. After the flood receded the appellant approached the authorities and the Government for redress and claimed damages of approximately Rupees Four Lakhs. It was asked by the Government to get it privately assessed, and the Chief Engineer Charotar Gram Udhar Sahkari Mandali Limited, Vallabh Vidyanagar did submit a report on 30th August, 1956. On 24th August, 1956 on Official Committee was appointed and the Committee found that the appellant had suffered a loss of Rs. 1,58,735. Since this amount was not paid the appellant filed the suit for damages against the State. Amongst may defences raised the two main were that there was no negligence either in the construction of the bundh or

































































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