ORDER

1. Leave granted.

2. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

3. The facts in appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 16342 of 1996 are sufficient for disposal of the common controversy raised in these cases.

4. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, made on 18-6-1996 in WP No. 612 of 1996. The appellants had initiated disciplinary proceedings against the respondent on the imputation that on 15-9-1995 while driving the Corporations double-decker vehicle near Gandhi Hospital in Hyderabad City, due to lack of anticipation, he had caused an accident in which a cyclist died. Consequently, action was initiated for misconduct and enquiry was ordered for misconduct under Rule 28(ix) of the Employees Conduct Rules, 1963. It would appear that prosecution has been launched by the police for an offence punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC and in some cases under Section 338 IPC and they are pending trial. Therefore, the respondents filed writ petition in the High Court for stay of the departmental proceedings. The learned Single Judge stayed the proceedings. On appeal, the Division Bench confirmed the same. Thus, these appeals by special leave.

5. It is contended by Shri Altaf Ahmad, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellant that the High Court was not right in directing stay of the departmental enquiry on the ground that it would cause prejudice to the respondents at the trial. In the criminal case, the question is the culpability of rash and negligent driving of the respondent. In the departmental enquiry, the misconduct relates to his failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof by his conduct. Therefore, there would be no prejudice in conducting the departmental enquiry. The High Court, therefore, was not right in staying the proceedings.

6. In support thereof, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena [(1996) 6 SCC 417 : (1996) 7 Scale 363]. Shri L.N. Rao, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has contended that the ratio in that judgment itself would indicate that only in grave cases, the enquiry should be permitted to be completed as expeditiously as possible. Otherwise, the administration would be jeopardised. In this case, such a grave nature does not arise. The facts in both, the criminal case and the disciplinary enquiry, constitute the same cause of action or material disclosure of which would gravely prejudice the defence of the respondents in the criminal cases. Therefore, the High Court was right in staying the proceedings. In support thereof, he placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [(1988) 4 SCC 319 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 950]. He also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Food Corpn. of India v. George Varghese [1991 Supp (2) SCC 143 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1174 : (1991) 17 ATC 339]. Therein, the question was that whether the High Court would be justified in quashing the enquiry proceedings, after the acquittal of the delinquent officer in the criminal case ? The High Court had held in that case that it was not expedient to conduct enquiry after acquittal. While interfering with that view and holding that the employer is entitled to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, after the acquittal, this Court made an observation that the employer fairly had stayed its hands till the conclusion of the criminal case so that it would not be contended that the employer intended to overreach the judicial proceedings. That observation, far from helping the respondents, would go to show that it would be open to the employer to take appropriate disciplinary action based upon the fact-situation; whether it could be proceeded with or not would be left to the disciplinary authority and the facts and circumstances obtainable in each case requires to be considered.

7. The rival content