(1) THIS is an appeal by a tenant against a judgment of the High court of Punjab and Haryana confirming a decree of eviction passed against him. There were two grounds on which eviction was sought. The first ground was that there was default in the payment of rent as con- templated in S. 13(2(1 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. The contention of the tenant is that this default could not furnish a ground for eviction as he deposited all the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the first date of hearing. The summons in the eviction proceedings was served on the tenant on 11/06/1976. The appellant-tenant as well as the respondents-landlords appeared in the tri- al court on 16/06/1976 and the case was adjourned to 30/06/1976. On J 30/06/1976, according to the appellant, he was ill and could not remain present. The case was proceeded ex parte and was adjourned to 12/07/1976. On Ju 12/07/1976, two witnesses were examined and the case was adjourned to 23/07/1976. It would thus appear that if the first date of hearing is regarded as 16/06/1976, as held by the High court in the judgment under appeal, the tenant admittedly did not deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of that date. Even if that is not regarded as the first date of hearing, in our view, 12/07/1976 must be regarded as the first date of hearing because it was an effective date of hearing in the sense that two witnesses were examined. It was only on 30/11/1976 that the arrears of rent were tendered. Thus there was no tender of arrears of rent within fifteen days of the first date of hearing meaning thereby the first effective hearing. It is true that the order directing the matter to proceed ex parte was set aside on the application of the tenant, but that would not make 12/07/1976 any the less the first date of hearing. Thus, the ground of default is clearly made out.

(2) EVEN on the other ground, namely, bona fide requirement nothing has been pointed out to us which would make us enter into a re-appraisal of the evidence in an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(3) IN the result, there is no merit in the appeal and the appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.