1. Writ petition under Article 226 for decree implementation — Interim order for partial delivery of timber — Contempt proceedings initiated for non-compliance while stay application pending. (Para 2 , 3 )
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1992 Supreme(SC) 568
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
L.M.Sharma : M.N.Venkatachaliah : S.Mohan
State Of Jammu And Kashmir
Versus
Mohd.Yaqoob Khan
Case No. : 3472 of 1992
Date of Decision : 8/26/92
Advocates Appeared: Battacharya S.K. : Bhandare M.C. : Mathur Ashok : Salve Harish N.
Advocates:
ASHOK MATHUR, HARISH N.SLAVE, M.C.BHANDARE, S.K.BHATTACHARJEE
ASHOK MATHUR, HARISH N.SLAVE, M.C.BHANDARE, S.K.BHATTACHARJEE
Contempt proceedings for non-compliance with an interim order are premature if the stay application in the main case is still pending. Merits of the claim should not be adjudicated in contempt proceedings, and execution of decrees is governed by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Headnote:(A) Constitution of India - Article 226 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 47 - Contempt of Court - Enforcement of interim order while stay application is pending - Contempt proceedings are distinct from the main case - Respondents cannot be compelled to argue merits of a claim in contempt proceedings under threat of punishment (Para 6) - Mandatory directions cannot be justified without considering objections and recording a prima facie finding (Para 7).
(B) Writ Petition - Maintainability - Application filed for the purpose of executing a decree - Dispute covered by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure - Question of maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 in such circumstances (Para 7).
Facts of the case:
A writ petition was filed for the implementation of a modified decree. An ex parte interim order was passed directing the delivery of 50% of the agreed timber. While the stay application in the main petition was still pending, a contempt petition was filed for non-compliance. The High Court, relying on a commissioner's report, directed the implementation of the interim order within the contempt proceedings.
Findings of Court:
The proceedings in the contempt case were premature and misconceived as the stay application in the main writ petition had not been finally disposed of. The High Court should have first adjudicated the stay matter before proceeding with the contempt case.
Issues: Whether contempt proceedings can be initiated and orders passed for the implementation of an interim direction while the stay application in the main writ petition remains pending.
Ratio Decidendi: The scope of contempt proceedings is different from the main case. It is improper to require respondents to meet the merits of a claim in a contempt proceeding at the risk of punishment. A mandatory direction cannot be justified unless the court considers objections and records a prima facie finding. Additionally, if a dispute relates to the execution of a decree, it is governed by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, affecting the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226.
Result: Appeal allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside.
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2. State contends contempt proceedings are premature while stay application is pending; Respondent argues contempt orders effectively disposed of the stay matter. (Para 3 , 5 )
3. Contempt proceedings differ from main cases; mandatory interim directions require prima facie findings; writ petitions for decree execution may be barred by Section 47, CPC. (Para 6 , 7 )
4. Contempt proceedings for non-compliance with interim orders are premature and unjustified if the underlying stay application remains pending and undecided. (Para 6 , 7 )
5. Appeal allowed — Impugned order set aside — High Court directed to dispose of stay application before proceeding with contempt charges. (Para 8 )
6. Can contempt proceedings be initiated for non-compliance with an interim order while a stay application is still pending?
No. The court held that contempt proceedings are premature and misconceived if the stay matter in the writ petition has not been finally disposed of, as the scope of contempt is different from the main case. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 )
7. What is required before a court can issue a mandatory direction in an interim order?
A mandatory direction cannot be justified unless the court considers the objections raised by the respondents and records a prima facie finding in favor of the petitioner. (Para 7 )
8. Is a writ petition under Article 226 maintainable for the execution of a decree?
The court observed that disputes regarding the discharge of liability under a decree and compromise are covered by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, potentially rendering such writ petitions non-maintainable. (Para 7 )
JUDGMENT
L.M.SHARMA, J.
(1) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties. Special leave is granted.
(2) THE appeal is directed against the order dated 19/03/1992 (signed by the Honble Judge on 20/03/1992 passed on an application of the respondent 1 being C.C.A. No. 25 of 1990 for initiating a proceeding for contempt of court against the appellant-State and two of its officers, namely, S.S. Billoria, secretary to government-of Jammu and Kashmir and Shri N.R. Gupta, Commissioner/Secretary, government of Jammu and Kashmir for non-compliance of the direction issued by the court under its order 19/03/1990. In view of the order which we are proposing to pass, it is not necessary to deal with all the facts leading to the present case in detail and it will be sufficient for the purposes of the appeal to set out the circumstances briefly, as mentioned hereafter.
(3) RESPONDENT 1 filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution registered as Writ Petition No. 133 of 1990 for the implementation of, what has been described by Mr Bhandare, the learned counsel for the respondents, as a decree modified subsequently by a compromise between the parties. On 19/03/1990 an ex parte interim order was passed by the High court directing notice to be issued to the respondents in the writ petition as also in the stay matter with a direction that the case would be listed in the second week of May 1990. The order further said that in the meantime, out of the agreed timber in accordance with the compromise entered into between the writ petitioner and the government, 50 per cent of the timber shall be given to the writ petitioner on his furnishing a bond. According to Mr Salve, the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant and its officers were expecting that they were not required to immediately obey the interim direction, as the stay matter was fixed to be heard in the second week of May 1990, and specially as there was no time indicated for compliance of the direction. However, the writ petitioner, without waiting for the next date in the case, filed the application on 2/04/1990 on which the impugned order was passed. According to Mr Salve the stay application was still pending final disposal and the appellant was to be heard. Then again, there was no occasion for assuming that the ex parte order, which did not even mention any period for compliance, had to be obeyed immediately. At this stage it has to be appreciated that the aforesaid direction although passed as an interim order in a pending interlocutory matter was, in substance, a final order allowing the writ petition in part without hearing the other side. The direction was not for maintenance of status quo; nor again was it a restraint order on the State authorities forbidding them from taking any step to which the writ petitioner could have an objection. As a result of the interim direction, the writ petitioner was to receive the fruits of the decree (in the language of the learned counsel for the respondents before us, that is, the writ petitioner) to the extent of half. The facts disclose that the stakes in the case are very high. According to the State it had already paid a huge amount of money. Mainly it has discharged its obligation in full. Hence it is not liable to pay anything further or to deliver any timber as claimed by the writ petitioner. That issue remains to be decided at the time of the final hearing of the writ petition.
(4) THE matter was pending for some time. By an order passed on 26/07/1991 in the contempt matter two Commissioners were appointed by the court for submitting a report as indicated in the order. The Commissioners accordingly submitted a report. The contempt proceeding was disposed of by the impugned order whereby the State has been asked to implement the interim direction issued on 19/03/1991 in the light of the Commissioners report. Dealing with the objections raised on behalf of the State, the High co
