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2007 Supreme(SC) 947

2007(5) Supreme 458
Supreme Court of India
(From Karnataka High Court)
P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.
M/s R.N. Jadi & Brothers & Ors. — Petitioners
versus
Subhashchandra — Respondent
Appeal (civil) 2925 of 2007
Civil Appeal No.. 2925 of 2007
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 14606 of 2006)
Decided on : 10-07-2007

important point
It would be proper to encourage the belief in litigants that the imperative of Order VIII Rule 1 must be adhered to and that only in rare and exceptional cases the breach thereof will be condoned.

Headnote:Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Scope of certain provisions – Order VIII, rule 1 and section 148 were amended with the laudable object to avoid delay in disposal of suits – The legislative intent to limit or curtail the power of the court to extend the time for filing a written statement is obvious from a conjoint reading of these provisions – In addition, Order V Rule 1 and Order VII, rule 14 provide that summons itself should contain directions for limitations for appearance and extension of time, and all documents relied upon shall be listed and produced with the plaint; and if that is not done, it cannot be produced without the leave of the court (Paras 2 and 3)

       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VIII Rule 1 – It was earlier held that the provision was directory and not mandatory and the extension of time beyond 90 days was not automatic and that the court, for reasons to be recorded, had to be satisfied that there was sufficient justification for departing from the time limit fixed by the Code and the power inhering in the court in terms of Section 148 of the Code – But there could be situations where even a procedural provision could be construed as mandatory, however, the earlier judgment is no authority for receiving written statements, after the expiry of the period permitted by law, in a routine manner – It would be proper to encourage the belief in litigants that the imperative of Order VIII Rule 1 must be adhered to and that only in rare and exceptional cases, the breach thereof will be condoned. (Paras 5 and 6)

       (2005) 4 SCC 480 – Relied upon.

       (1968) 1 All E.R. 543 – Referred.

       Facts of the case :

       Scope of amendment of certain provisions of CPC is discussed in this judgment.

       Findings of the Court:

       The amendments in the relevant provisions of CPC have been made with the laudable object to avoid delay in disposal of suits. However the provisions have to be applied with caution.

Judgement Key Points
  • Amendments to Order VIII Rule 1 and Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure were introduced to curb delays in suit disposal by imposing strict time limits for filing written statements. (!) [1000407480001]

  • Order VIII Rule 1 limits the time for filing a written statement to 90 days from service of summons, with courts' power to extend time further restricted by an outer limit of 30 days from the originally fixed date. (!) [1000407480001]

  • Summons under Order V Rule 1 must direct the defendant to file the written statement within one month of receipt, with extension limited to 90 days total. (!) [1000407480002]

  • Order VII Rule 14 requires plaintiffs to list and produce documents with the plaint; failure to do so prevents later production without court leave, reducing prejudice to defendants in adhering to timelines. (!) [1000407480002]

  • Insisting on written statements within 90 days generally causes no injustice to defendants given accompanying procedural safeguards. (!) [1000407480003]

  • While procedure serves justice and courts should avoid technical defeats, amendments demand cautious application to prevent undermining legislative intent against delays. (!) [1000407480004]

  • Prior views treating Order VIII Rule 1 as directory do not justify routine acceptance of late written statements beyond statutory limits. [judgement_act_referred]

  • Extensions beyond 90 days must be rare, granted only with recorded justification, caution, and awareness of curtailed powers under Section 148. (!) [1000407480005]

  • Courts should foster litigants' adherence to Order VIII Rule 1's imperatives, condoning breaches only in exceptional cases to minimize suit delays. [important point] (!) [1000407480005]

  • Legislative scheme emphasizes timely pleadings to expedite justice, countering historical practices of prolonged delays. (!) [1000407480001][1000407480005]


JUDGMENT

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. —

1.I respectfully agree. The High Court was in error in setting aside the order of the trial court accepting the written statement filed by the defendants, in the circumstances of the case. I am prompted to make a few observations in the context of the discussion by my learned brother on the scope of the related provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2.It is notorious that suits were being dragged on by defendants in suits by not filing their written statements within a reasonable time. We are not unaware of cases where written statements were not filed even within two or three years of the filing of the suits. The control expected to be exercised by courts, by the scheme of the Code, was not being exercised leading to slackness in the matter of filing of pleadings in defence. It was in that context that the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were amended, the laudable object being to avoid delay in the disposal of suits. The Amended Order VIII Rule 1 fixes a time limit for the filing of written statements. But, Parliament did not stop with amending Order VIII Rule 1 alone i.e. introducing a time limit for filing written statements and restricting the power of the court to grant extension of time for filing written statements as 90 days from the date of service of summons. The power for extension of time granted to the court under Section 148 of the Code was curtailed by introducing an outer time limit of 30 days from the date originally fixed or granted. Thus, the legislative intent to limit or curtail the power of the court to extend the time for filing a written statement is obvious from a conjoint reading of these provisions.

3.In addition to the time limit prescribed in Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, it is provided in Order V Rule 1 that the summons issued to the defendant should itself provide that he has to appear and file his written statement within one month of receipt of it and limiting the power of the court to extend the time for written statement to 90 days. The summons is to be accompanied by a copy of the plaint. It simultaneously introduced Rule 14 to Order VII providing that where the plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon a document in his possession or power, in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list and shall produce it in court when the plaint is presented by him and shall at the same time deliver the document and copy thereof to be filed with the plaint. Sub-rule (3) was introduced to provide that if the document is not included in the list, or is not produced with the plaint, it was not to be produced without the leave of the court and without the leave of the court it shall not be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.

4.In such a position, normally no injustice would be caused to the defendant in insisting upon his filing the written statement at least within 90 days of having received the summons in the suit. I think that it would be proper to avoid an interpretation that may tend to thwart the legislative intent in such circumstances.

5.It is true that procedure is the handmaid of justice. The court must always be anxious to do justice and to prevent victories by way of technical knock-outs. But how far that concept can be stretched in the context of the amendments brought to the Code and in the light of the mischief that was sought to be averted is a question that has to be seriously considered. I am conscious that I was a party to the decision in Kailash vs. Nankhu and others,1 (2005 (4) SCC 480) which held that the provision was directory and not mandatory. But there could be situations where even a procedural provision could be construed as mandatory, no doubt retaining a power in the court, in an appropriate case, to exercise a jurisdiction to take out the rigor of that provision or to mitigate genuine hardship. It was in that context that in Kailash vs. Nankhu and others (supra) it was st


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