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2007(8) Supreme 533
Supreme Court of india
Dr. Arijit Pasayat & Aftab Alam, JJ.
M/s Singh Enterprises — Petitioner
versus
Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors. — Respondents
Appeal (civil) 5949 of 2007
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4720 of 2006)
Decided on : 14-12-07
Central Excise Act, 1944 - Section 35 - Appeal filed by appellant under Section 35 - Dismissed by Commissioner on ground that appeal having being filed after 21 months of date of service of original order ,appellate authority not had power to condone delay beyond period of 30 days from date of expiry of period of 60 days prescribed for filing statutory appeal - Writ Petition-Dismissed by High Court-Appeal- Instantly, explanation offered for abnormal delay of nearly 20 months was that appellant concern was practically closed after 1998 and it was only opened for some short period- From application for condonation of delay, it appeared that appellant had categorically accepted that on receipt of order same was immediately handed over to consultant for filing an appeal - If that was so, plea that because of lack of experience in business there was delay did not stand to be reason - Causes shown for condonation held to have no acceptable value - Commissioner and High Court were hence held justified in holding that there was no power to condone delay after expiry of 30 days period - Appeal dismissed. (Para 10)
Words and phrases - Sufficient cause - Meaning of - Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes - It essentially means as adequate or enough. (Para 10)
Facts of the case :
Appeal was filed herein in the instant case by appellant under Section 35 of Central Excise Act, 1944. Said Appeal was dismissed by Commissioner on ground that appeal having being filed after 21 months of date of service of original order ,appellate authority not had power to condone delay beyond period of 30 days from date of expiry of period of 60 days prescribed for filing statutory appeal. Writ Petition there against was dismissed by High Court.
Present appeal has been filed against said order of High Court.
Findings of the court :
The Court held that instantly, explanation offered for abnormal delay of nearly 20 months was that appellant concern was practically closed after 1998 and it was only opened for some short period. From application for condonation of delay, it appeared that appellant had categorically accepted that on receipt of order same was immediately handed over to consultant for filing an appeal. If that was so, plea that because of lack of experience in business there was delay did not stand to be reason. Causes shown for condonation held to have no acceptable value. Commissioner and High Court were hence held justified in holding that there was no power to condone delay after expiry of 30 days period.
Result : Appeal allowed.
Certainly. Here are the key points derived from the provided legal document:
There is no rigid or one-size-fits-all approach for accepting or rejecting explanations for delay in filing appeals or steps, emphasizing flexibility in judicial discretion (!) .
The statutory provisions specify that appeals must generally be filed within a prescribed period (e.g., 60 days), with a limited extension of up to 30 days if the appellant can demonstrate sufficient cause (!) (!) .
The appellate authority's power to condone delay is limited to a maximum of 30 days beyond the statutory period; it does not have authority to permit filings after this extended period (!) (!) .
If an appeal is filed after the maximum permissible period, such delay cannot be condoned based solely on reasons such as lack of experience or temporary closure of the appellant’s concern, especially if the appellant admits to immediate handing over of the order to a representative for filing (!) (!) .
The concept of "sufficient cause" is context-dependent and must be assessed based on the specific circumstances; it is not a blanket justification and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis (!) (!) .
Even in cases where statutory authority lacks the power to condone delay, courts may still exercise their constitutional powers under Article 226 to consider condoning delay, though this is subject to judicial discretion and the specifics of the case (!) .
The decision emphasizes that statutory provisions governing limitation and condonation are clear and that judicial discretion has limits, especially where the law explicitly restricts the period for filing appeals (!) .
Overall, the judgment underscores the importance of adhering to statutory timelines for filing appeals and the limited scope for condoning delays beyond prescribed periods, reaffirming the necessity for timely action in legal proceedings (!) (!) .
Please let me know if you need further analysis or assistance.
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.—
1.Leave granted.
2.Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant. Before the High Court appellant had challenged the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise and Service Tax, Ranchi dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (in short the Act). The said order was challenged before the High Court by filing a Writ Petition. The Commissioner had dismissed the appeal only on the ground that it was filed after 21 months of the date of service of the original order and the appellate authority did not have power to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days from the date of expiry of period of 60 days prescribed for filing the statutory appeal.
3.The Division Bench noted that since the Commissioner had no power of condonation beyond the statutorily prescribed period, therefore, the writ petition was without merit. Before the High Court reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Union of India1, (1998 (8) SCC 610) to contend that the High Court had the power to condone the delay. This stand was not accepted by the High Court.
4.In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even if it is conceded for the sake of argument that the Commissioner had no power to condone the delay, yet the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution) can condone the delay. It is stated that the power in this regard is untrammeled by any statutory provision.
5.Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the orders of the Commissioner and the High Court.
6.At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of Section 35 of the Act which reads as follows :
“35. APPEALS TO COMMISSIONER (APPEALS).
(1)Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise, may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) [hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the Commissioner (Appeals)] within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order :
Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.
(2)Every appeal under this section shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner.”
7.It is to be noted that the periods ‘sixty days’ and ‘thirty days’ have been substituted for ‘within three months’ and ‘three months’ by Act 14 of 2001, with effect from 11.5.2001.
8.The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of Statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the Statute. The period upto which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the Limitation Act) can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate au
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