important point
Where recruitment is made without there being a sanctioned post and de hors Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, Labour court should not pass an order of reinstatement.

judgment

S.B. Sinha, J. –

1.Leave granted.

2. Appellant is an authority constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (Act). It is a Local Authority within the meaning of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

3.For its various projects, it appoints daily wagers on an ad hoc basis. Respondent herein was appointed by the Authority on 1.4.1988 as an Amin. Appellant contends that he was appointed on a periodical basis depending on the order of sanction issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh from time to time. On the premise that the sanction for the said appointment was granted only upto 30.3.1990, he was disengaged from services.

An industrial dispute was raised by the respondent. The State made a reference for adjudication thereof by the Presiding Court, Labour Court, U.P., Ghaziabad which is to the following effect;

“Whether the disengagement/deprivation, by the employers, of their workman Shri Ashok Kumar s/o Mahipal Singh, Amin from the work with effect from 1.5.1990 is proper and lawful? If not, what benefit/reliefs the workman concerned is entitled to get, along with any other particulars?”

3.Before the Labour Court, first respondent contended that since his date of recruitment, i.e., on and from 1.4.1988 till 9.4.1990, he continued to work. It, however, appears that his services had been dispensed with on 1.4.1990.

It was urged that as despite the fact that he had worked for more than 240 days in one year, the mandatory requirements of Section 6-N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had not been complied with, the same was illegal and, thus, he was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Appellant, however, in his written statement apart from denying and disputing the averments made by the respondent that he had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his retrenchment, categorically stated that as the Government did not create any post, no work from the first respondent could be taken and his services therefore, automatically came to an end after 30.3.1990.

The learned Labour Court in its award opined that the respondent No. 1 had worked for more than 240 days in an year and as the requirement of the provisions of Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 had not been complied with, he is entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages.

It was, however, directed;

“He be re-employed accordingly.”

4.A Writ Petition was preferred thereagainst by the appellant before the Allahabad High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said Writ Petition has been dismissed.

5.Mr. Mahavir Singh, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the Tribunal and consequently the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the services of the first respondent having been availed only on a periodical basis, it was not necessary for the appellant to comply with the provisions of Section 6-N of the Act. It was furthermore urged that the Tribunal in the aforementioned factual backdrop could not have directed reinstatement of the first respondent.

Ms. Tatini Basu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment.

6.Although, a contention has been raised in the Special Leave Petition that a statutory authority like the appellant is not an Industry within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the same was not pressed.

7.Before us, the offer of appointment has not been produced. Whether Respondent No. 1 continued to work on and from 1.4.1988 in terms of the said offer of appointment or it was renewed from time to time on the basis of grant of sanction thereof by the State of U.P. for specific periods is not known.

We would, thus, have to proceed on the basis that the first respondent worked with the appellant authority for the entire period between 1.4.1988 and 31.3.1990. If that