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1939 Supreme(SC) 1
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD ATKIN, LORD THANKERTON, LORD WRIGHT, LORD PORTER, AND SIR GEORGE RANKIN.
PAKALA NARAYANA SWAMI - Appellant
Versus
THE KING-EMPEROR - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Patna.
Decided On : Jan. 20. 1939.
Solicitors for the appellant:Hy. S. L. Polak & Co. Solicitor for the respondent: The Solicitor, India Office.
Statements by a deceased regarding their destination are admissible as "circumstances of the transaction" under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Additionally, Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits the use of any statement made to police during an investigation, including those made by the accused.
Headnote:(A) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 32(1) - Statements by deceased as to circumstances of transaction resulting in death - A statement made by a deceased person that he was proceeding to the spot where he was killed, or his reasons for doing so, or that he was going to meet a particular person, constitutes "circumstances of the transaction" and is admissible, regardless of whether the person was under expectation of death at the time. Such statements must have some proximate relation to the actual occurrence. (Paras 14-17)
(B) Code of Criminal Procedure - Section 162 - Admissibility of statements made to police during investigation - The expression "any person" in the section is wide enough to include a person who is ultimately accused. Statements made to a police officer in the course of an investigation, if reduced to writing, cannot be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial in respect of the offence under investigation. (Paras 19-23)
(C) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 25 - Definition of "Confession" - A confession must either admit the offence in terms or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession if it does not admit the offence. (Paras 27-28)
Facts of the case:
The body of a deceased man was found dismembered in a trunk on a train. Evidence was presented that the deceased had informed his spouse of his intention to visit the house of the accused to collect a debt. It was established that the accused had purchased a trunk of the same description shortly before the body was found and had transported said trunk to the railway station. A statement was made by the accused to the police during the investigation admitting the deceased had visited his house.
Findings of Court:
The statement of the deceased to his spouse was admissible as a circumstance of the transaction resulting in death. The statement made by the accused to the police was inadmissible under the procedural code. However, the remaining circumstantial evidence regarding the purchase and transport of the trunk, combined with the deceased's stated intent, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder.
Issues: Whether the statement of the deceased regarding his destination was admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act; whether a statement made by an accused to the police during an investigation is barred by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and the legal definition of a "confession."
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that "circumstances of the transaction" under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act include statements about the deceased's destination and purpose of travel. It further ruled that Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to all persons, including the accused, prohibiting the use of statements made to police during investigations. Finally, it clarified that a confession requires an admission of the offence itself, not merely an incriminating fact.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Key Points: - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!)
Question 1?
How to determine the admissibility of statements made by an accused to a police officer during investigation under s. 162 CrPC when the accused is later charged?
Question 2?
What is the proper interpretation of s. 32(1) and s. 162 in relation to admissibility of statements under 32(1) of the Evidence Act and 162 CrPC?
Question 3?
What are the standards for evaluating many evidentiary challenges—whether a decontextualized statement (even if admitted) suffices to sustain a murder conviction when other overwhelming evidence exists?
Legal Category Hierarchy
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crime and sentencing
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offences against the person
- murder
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offences against the person
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practice and procedure
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evidence
- admissibility of statements
- confessions
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evidence
Judgement
Appeal by Special Leave (No. 81 of 1938) from a judgment of the High Court (November 9, 1937), which confirmed a judgment of the Sessions Judge of Berhampore (September 15, 1937).
The appellant was convicted of the murder of a man whose dismembered body was found in a trunk on March 23, 1937.
At the trial, a statement made by the deceased to his wife on March 20, 1937, to the effect that he was going to the house of the appellant on March 21 and a statement by the appellant to a police officer investigating the crime on April 4 to the effect that the deceased slept at the appellants house on the night of March 21 and left the following day were admitted in evidence.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that, having regard to s. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act and
s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, these statements were inadmissible in evidence and that, apart from these statements, the evidence was insufficient to justify a conviction.
The material facts are more fully stated in the judgment of the Board.
1938. Dec. 12,15,16,19. Pritt K.C. and H. W. Williams for the appellant. On the question of the admissibility of a statement made by an accused person to a police officer during his investigation and recorded under s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there has been a divergence of view in the High Courts in India. The judgment of Rankin J. in Azimuddy v. Emperor (( 1926) I. L. R. 54 Cal. 237.) and that of Reilly J. in In re Syamo Maha Patro (( 1932) I. L. R. 55 Mad. 903.) are typical of the two views. In my submission, the correct view is that taken by Reilly J. The section in terms absolutely prohibits statements made to the police during investigation being used except for the purposes therein provided for and a statement made by an accused person cannot fall within the saving clause. The view taken in Jogendranath Gorai v. Emperor (( 1935) I. L. R. 63 Cal. 419.), a later Calcutta case, differed from that in Azimuddys case (( 1926) I. L. R. 54 Cal. 237.) but Azimuddys case (( 1926) I. L. R. 54 Cal. 237.) was not referred to in it. There are a number of decisions on the question. We have an agreed list of cases on the point, and, with permission, will put it in. [The Board directed the list to be handed in.]
If the statement is one of an incriminating nature, it would also be ruled out as a confession under s. 25 of the Evidence Act. " Confession " is not defined. But, upon the authorities, it appears that if the statement of the accused proves facts which are part of the incriminating facts of the prosecutions case, if the accused says something which can fairly be construed as " I committed the offence," his statement would be a confession. If the statement is a mere admission which simply provides a fact which is not sinister, then it is not a confession. The case here, I submit, falls within the rule in Imperatrix v. Pandharinath (( 1881) I. L. R. 6 Bom. 34.) which is confirmed in Queen-Empress
v. Nana. (( 1889) I. L. R. 14 Bom. 260.) The strongest case the other way is Emperor v. Kangal Mali . (( 1905) I. L. R. 41 Cal. 601.) The other question is that of the admissibility of the statement made by the deceased to his wife to the effect that he was going to the house of the accused. I submit that this statement cannot be said to be a statement as to a circumstance of the transaction which resulted in his death. The transaction, in my submission, means the activities which resulted in the death Rego v. Emperor . (( 1933) I. L. R. 29 Nag. 251,259.) But this case is against me on the question under s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
[The rest of the argument was directed to the facts, on the assumption that the two statements were inadmissible in evidence.]
G. D. Roberts K.C., Wallach and Megaw for the respondent. (Called on to reply only on the questions raised under s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and ss. 25 and 32 of the Evidence Act.) We submit that the words " any person
