1936 Supreme(SC) 67
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD ROCHE, SIR SHADI LAL, AND SIR GEORGE RANKIN.
R. T. RANGACHARI - Appellant
Versus
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL - Respondents
On appeal from the High Court at Madras.
Decided On : Dec. 8. 1936.
Solicitors for appellant:G. K. Kannepalli. Solicitor for respondent: Solicitor, India Office.
Civil courts are barred from granting declarations regarding the validity of a government servant's dismissal if such a declaration would indirectly affect the government's liability to pay a pension, notwithstanding that the dismissal may be a nullity or violate statutory procedural safeguards.
Headnote:(A) The Pensions Act, 1871 - Sections 4 and 6 - Government of India Act - Section 96B - Jurisdiction of Civil Courts - Suit relating to pension - Prohibition on making orders affecting the liability of Government to pay pension - A suit seeking a declaration that a removal from service was invalid, where such declaration would effectively entitle the plaintiff to a pension, is barred by the statutory prohibition against courts entertaining suits relating to pensions or affecting the government's liability to pay them.
(B) Government of India Act - Section 96B - Proviso - Dismissal by subordinate authority - Statutory safeguard - The proviso that no person in the civil service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed is a statutory safeguard that must be observed; a dismissal issued by a subordinate official is bad and inoperative.
(C) Service Law - Removal after retirement - An order purporting to remove an employee from service after they have already duly and properly ceased to be in service is a nullity.
Facts of the case:
A police officer was subject to an official inquiry for irregular conduct. The competent authority decided to drop the charges and allowed the officer to retire on an invalid pension. After the pension had been sanctioned and paid for several months, a successor official, upon discovering the adverse inquiry report, issued an order removing the officer from service retrospectively from the date of retirement and stopped the pension. The officer sought a declaration that he was not liable to be removed from service subsequent to his retirement.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the order of removal was a nullity as the officer had already ceased to be in service. Furthermore, the dismissal was illegal because it was issued by an official lower in rank than the appointing authority, violating the statutory proviso of the governing Act. However, the court held that it could not grant the declaration because the action was essentially a claim for pension, which is prohibited under the Pensions Act.
Issues: Whether a removal from service issued after proper retirement is valid; whether a dismissal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority is legal; and whether a civil court can grant a declaration regarding such removal if it affects the government's liability to pay a pension.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that while the dismissal was both a nullity and a violation of statutory safeguards regarding the appointing authority, the express provisions of the Pensions Act bar civil courts from entertaining any suit or making any decree that affects the government's liability to pay pensions, directly or indirectly. Since the requested declaration would impact the pension, the court lacked jurisdiction.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
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administrative law
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public employment
- dismissal and removal
- pension rights
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public employment
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practice and procedure
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jurisdiction
- statutory bar
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jurisdiction
Judgement
Appeal (No. 14 of 1936) in forma pauperis, by special leave, from a decree of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (December 19, 1933) affirming a decree of the High Court in its original jurisdiction (October 17, 1930).
The appellant, R. T. Rangachari, was a Sub-Inspector of Police. In 1927 charges of irregular and improper conduct in the exercise of his duties were made against him. After an official inquiry the responsible official was of opinion that the charges should be dropped, and the appellant, after a medical certificate had been granted in respect of illness, was retired from the service with am invalid pension. Three months later the matter was reopened by the successors in office of the officials, and an order was made purporting to remove the appellant from the service from the date upon which he was invalided, and his pension was stopped.
The appellant instituted proceedings against the respondent, the Secretary of State for India in Council, seeking a declaration that he was not liable to be removed from the service subsequent to his retirement, and he also claimed damages.
The facts and the relevant statutory provisions appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
The trial judge (Waller J.) and the Appellate Court (Beasley C.J. and Bardswell J.) were both of opinion that in substance the claim was for a declaration that the appellant was entitled to his pension, and both Courts held that the action was one which, by virtue of the provisions of The Pensions Act
(XXIII. of 1871), a Civil Court was prohibited from entertaining. The appeal is reported at ( 1934) I. L.
R. 57 M. 857.
1936. Nov. 5, 6, 9 and 10. J. M. Parikh and Abdul Majid for the appellant. When the Government of India Act was passed all the rules made thereunder became part of the contract of service. Art. 351 of the Civil Service Regulations, which provides that " future good conduct is an implied condition of every grant of a pension," was, under s. 96B., sub-s. 4, confirmed, and there has therefore been introduced into the contract of service a term which includes the grant of a pension. The terms of the contract of employment are those stated in the rules, and if, therefore, there has been a breach of the rules it would be against the terms of the contract. [Reference was made to Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State for India (( 1861) 5 Bom. H. C.
R. (Appx.) 1.), and Secretary of State for India in Council v. Shreegobinda Chaudhuri . (( 1932) I- L.
R. 59 C. 1289.)] Wherever there is a contract and a breach of it, an action lies against the Secretary of State for India in Council.
[Lord Roche. I should think that that is right if the word contract is confined to meaning a contract which is enforceable.]
R. T. Rangachari V. Secretary of State for India in Council 213
A breach of such a contract by an officer of the Government in his executive capacity is not an act of State, or a Sovereign act, as the Court below has held see per Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria (Officer Administering). ([ 1931] A. C. 662, 671.) In Ram Das Hazra v. Secretary of State for India in Council (( 1912) 18 C. W. N. 106.), is given a list of cases decided before 1919; they are cases where it was decided that the plaintiffs held their offices during pleasure or at pleasure.
It was stated in Shenton v. Smith ([ 1895] A. C. 229.), that " A Colonial Government is on the same footing as the Home Government as to the employment and dismissal of servants of the Crown ; and in the absence of special contract they hold their offices during the pleasure of the Crown and the Board were of opinion that the regulations in that case were mere directions and had no legal effect. In Gould v. Stuart ([ 1896] A. C. 575.) the position was different, the Board being of opinion that it was inconsistent with the Act under the provisions of which the plaintiff held his appointment to conclude that the office was held a