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1918 Supreme(SC) 73
PRIVY COUNCIL [ON APPEAL FROM THEEAST INDIES]
LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE, LORD PHILLIMORE, SIR JOHN EDGE AND MR. AMEER ALI.
SUNDERBAI - Appellant
Versus
THE COLLECTOR OF BELGAUM - Respondents
On Appeal from the High Court at Bombay.
Decided On : Oct. 15. 1918.
Solicitors for appellants: T. L. Wilson & Co.
Solicitors for respondents: Ranken Ford, Ford & Chester.
The plaintiff's valuation of consequential relief in a declaratory suit determines jurisdiction. Additionally, reliance on mistaken legal advice regarding the proper forum for appeal can constitute "sufficient cause" for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.
Headnote:(A) Suits Valuation Act, 1887, s. 8; Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 7, para iv (c); Civil Courts Act, ss. 8, 26 - Where a plaintiff sues for a declaratory decree and asks for consequential relief, and puts their own valuation upon that consequential relief, then for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, the value that the plaintiff puts upon the plaint determines both.
(B) Indian Limitation Act, 1908, s. 5 - Reliance on mistaken legal advice as to the proper forum for appeal may constitute "sufficient cause" for condoning delay in presenting an appeal to the correct court.
(C) Property Law - The alienability of vatan lands depends on the nature of the settlement and the specific terms of the grant, and may be determined by whether the lands are treated as personal holdings.
Facts of the case:
A widow and an alleged adopted son challenged a will and codicil executed by the deceased, claiming that the vatan lands were inalienable and that the adoption was valid. A trial court granted the declarations and an injunction. The respondents appealed, initially filing the appeal in the High Court. The High Court later determined that the appeal lay to the District Court and directed the memorandum of appeal to be returned. By the time the appeal was presented to the District Court, the limitation period had expired. The High Court subsequently condoned the delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and modified the trial court's decree, finding some lands alienable and the adoption invalid.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the valuation provided by the plaintiff in the plaint determines the jurisdiction. It held that the delay in filing the appeal was excusable as the parties acted bona fide on mistaken legal advice. Regarding the merits, it affirmed that some properties were alienable and others were not, and that the adoption was invalid as the plaintiffs were estopped by the decree in the probate proceedings.
Issues: Whether the valuation of consequential relief determines jurisdiction; whether mistaken legal advice constitutes sufficient cause for condoning delay under the Limitation Act; and whether the vatan lands were alienable and the adoption valid.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the plaintiff's valuation of consequential relief in a declaratory suit governs jurisdiction. It further held that acting on mistaken legal advice can be a valid ground for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Finally, it upheld the finding that the adoption was invalid due to estoppel arising from the probate proceedings.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (August 1, 1913) reversing a decree of the first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum (April 6, 1910).
The first appellant was the sole widow of Lingappa Jayappa Sar Desai of Navalgund. The deceased was the last of a series of Desais whose title came into existence in the time of the Bijapur monarchy in the 17th century. The Desai was the chief revenue officer of the district under both the Mahomedan rule and the Maratha rule which followed it. During the tenure of office of the family to which the deceased belonged many inam grants of villages had been made to the Desai for the time being. The services of the Desai as a revenue officer were not made use of during the British rule, and he was informed in 1848 by the Collector, under the provisions of s. 2 of Bombay Act. II. of 1843, that his services as a revenue official would not be required. At that time and for many years afterwards the officials of the British Government in the Southern Maratha country were occupied in investigating and coming to settlements regarding claims to inam lands held for service or as a reward for past services.
As a result of those investigations, and on the request of the revenue commissioner, a Government resolution on February 6, 1862, sanctioned the treatment of the Navalgund Desais " potgee " as a personal holding continuable on the terms of summary settlement. In consequence of that sanction the offer of a settlement was made to the Desai in 1862, and was accepted on the terms that the commutation payment should be in the nature of a nazarana or quit rent. By s. 12 of Bombay Act II. of 1863 all settlements of the above character made in the district were expressly validated.
The deceased Desai by his will and a codicil, dated respectively June 6 and August 13, 1906, disposed of all the vatan property to the respondents upon certain trusts, the first respondent being named as executor. The will stated j that the testator had not authorized his wife to make an (adoption, and that he did not intend to do so. The Desai died on August 23, 1906, without issue.
The first respondent applied in the Court of the District Judge for probate, the application being opposed by the first and second appellants. It was alleged that the deceased had verbally revoked the will, and had given his wife authority to adopt a son to him, and that accordingly she had adopted the second appellant. After hearing evidence upon those allegations the District Judge on September 27, 1909, found against them, and ordered probate to issue. His decision was affirmed by the High Court.
Meanwhile, on February 22, 1909, the appellants instituted the present suit in the Court of the first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum against the respondents. They claimed, inter alia, (a) a declaration that the deceased had no power to make the will on the grounds that the deceased was mentally incompetent, and that the vatan lands were inalienable; (b) a declaration that the second appellant was the adopted son of the deceased; (c) an injunction restraining the respondents from recovering possession of the property in suit. By their plaint they valued each of the declarations at Rs. 130, and the injunction at Rs. 5, and paid court fees upon that basis.
The Subordinate Judge delivered judgment on April 16, 1910. He declined to decide issues as to the due execution and alleged revocation of the will owing to the pendency of the probate proceedings, but he decided all other issues in favour of the appellants. On the same date he made a decree embodying the two declarations and the injunction prayed for.
On July 19, 1910, the respondents lodged an appeal to the High Court. The appeal came oil for hearing on March 11, 1912, when a preliminary objection was taken that the appeal lay to the District Court. The learned judges (Chandavarkar and Batchelor JJ.), following previous decisions of the Court, held that the objection was valid, a
