JUDGMENT

Arijit Pasayat, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by learned single Judge of Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur refusing to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal passed by learned Special Judge, NDPS cases, Udaipur.

2. The accused faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 8 and 18 of Narcotic Drugs and Psycotropic Substances Act, 1985 ( in short `NDPS Act') for being in illegal possession of a large quantity of opium. The trial Court directed acquittal only on the ground that there was non-compliance with requirements of Section 50 of the Act. The State filed an application for grant of leave to file appeal against such judgment. The High Court dismissed the application holding that since there was non-compliance of mandatory requirement of Section 50 of the Act and there was no need for grant of leave.

3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in fact the recovery was made from a polythene bag and therefore Section 50 has no application.

4. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent.

5. The position relating to applicability of Section 50 of the Act when the search is of a bag, brief case or an article it was considered by a three Judge Bench of this Court in: 2005CriLJ2208 (State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar and State of Rajasthan v. Bhanwar Lal, in para 7, 8 10, 11 and 27 in Pawan Kumar's case it was held as follows:

7. The word "person" has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(xxix) of the Act says that the words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. The Code of Criminal Procedure, however, does not define the word "person". Section 2(y) of the Code says that the words and expressions used therein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code says that the word "person" includes any Company or Association or body of persons whether incorporated or not. Similar definition of the word "person" has been given in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, these definitions render no assistance for resolving the controversy in hand.

8. One of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edn. page 83-85). In the well known treatise - Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author has enunciated the same principle that the words of the Statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the Statute to suggest the contrary (See the Chapter - The Rule of Literal Construction - page 78, Ninth Edn.). This Court has also followed this principle right from the beginning. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.: AIR 1955 SC 376, S.R. Das, J. said: (SCR p.1374)

The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another mea