2012 (2) Supreme 674
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
G.S. Singhvi & Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, JJ.
Maniben Devraj Shah — Appellant
versus
Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai — Respondent
Civil Appeal Nos. 2970-2971 of 2012
Decided on : 9-4-2012
The Limitation Act, 1963-Law of limitation-Scope and ambit of- The law of limitation is founded on public policy- The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay- The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature- At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation- The expression sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice- No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay (Para 12)
Limitation Act,1963- Section 5- Exercise of power under- Even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost- What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation- If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay- If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay (Para 18)
Facts of the Case :
Whether the cause shown by Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (for short, the Corporation) for condonation of 7 years and 108 days delay in filing appeals against judgments and decrees dated 2.5.2003 passed by the City Civil Court (hereinafter referred to as the trial Court) in L.C. Suit Nos. 2726, 2727, 2728 of 1999 was sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court was justified in condoning the delay is the question which arises for consideration in these appeals.
Findings of the Court :
Unfortunately, Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in the story concocted by the Corporation about misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of judgment for more than 7 years. The cause shown by Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay could not but be treated as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Impugned order held liable to be set aside .Appeals were allowed.
JUDGMENT
G. S. Singhvi, J. — Whether the cause shown by Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (for short, the Corporation) for condonation of 7 years and 108 days delay in filing appeals against judgments and decrees dated 2.5.2003 passed by the City Civil Court (hereinafter referred to as the trial Court) in L.C. Suit Nos. 2726, 2727, 2728 of 1999 was sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court was justified in condoning the delay is the question which arises for consideration in these appeals.
2. At the outset, it deserves to be mentioned that the respondent had withdrawn one of the three appeals filed before the High Court and, as such, the impugned order makes a reference to the two appeals only.
3. The appellants filed suits for grant of a declaration that notices issued by the Corporation under Section 314 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (for short, the Act) for demolition of the properties specified in the plaints are illegal and not binding on them. They pleaded that the action taken by the Corporation is discriminatory and liable to be annulled because some persons whose structures were taken for road widening were allowed to construct mezzanine floor in the remaining portions of their respective properties and were also allotted alternative accommodation in the new building but they were not given similar benefit. The appellants further pleaded that they had entered into development agreements with Shamji D. Shah and Popatbhai Baghbhai Bharwad for developing the property and they will construct market for and on behalf of the Corporation. They prayed for issue of a direction to the respondent to provide shops in the market proposed to be constructed on C.T.S. No.997, Near Purnapragya High School, Bharucha Marg, Dahisar (E), Bombay.
4. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Corporation, an objection was taken to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that notice under Section 527 of the Act had not been given by the appellants. On merits, it was pleaded that the appellants had raised construction on a portion of the road and it had become necessary to demolish the same for widening the existing road.
5. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed identical issues in all the suits. For the sake of reference, the issues framed in LC Suit No. 2726 of 1999 titled Smt. Maniben Devraj Shah v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay are reproduced below:
ISSUES FINDINGS
1. Does the plaintiff prove that In the affirmative notice issued u/s. 314 of BMC Act is illegal, bad in law, malafides and inexcitable?
2. Does the plaintiff prove that In the affirmative she is entitled for alternate accommodation in lieu of structure affected by road widening?
3. Does the plaintiff prove that In the affirmative suit is maintainable for the want of notice u/s. 527 of BMC Act?
4. Whether the plaintiff is
As per final order entitled for any relief?
5. What order?
As per final order
6. After considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence produced by them, the trial Court decreed the suits by separate but identical judgments dated 2.5.2003.
7. The Corporation did not challenge the judgments of the trial Court within the prescribed period of limitation and filed appeals sometime in September, 2010 along with the applications for condonation of 7 years and 108 days delay. In support of its prayer for condonation of delay the Corporation also filed the affidavits of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar, Junior Law Officer. For the sake of reference, paragraph 3 of the application for condonation of delay and paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the affidavit of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar filed in First Appeal No. 3691 of 2010 titled Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai v. Smt. Maniben Devraj Shah are reproduced below: APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY 3) The applicants herein
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