The main legal point established in the judgment is that technicalities cannot defeat the purpose of adoption, particularly when there is overwhelming evidence supporting the validity of the adoption.

ORDER :

Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. The challenge in this appeal is to order dated 26.03.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, whereby in a Regular Second Appeal the High Court has reversed the concurrent findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.

4. The original plaintiff (Respondents are legal heirs) had instituted a suit against the appellant as defendant No. 1 for a declaration that adoption deed dated 07.06.1977 by which the defendant-appellant No. 1 was adopted by one Nanuwa to be void, illegal and inoperative in law. The original plaintiff in the suit was the daughter of the aforesaid Nanuwa.

5. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court dismissed the suit. The decree of dismissal has been reversed by the High Court in Second Appeal giving rise to this appeal.

6. We have heard Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants. Though a request has been made on behalf of the respondents for adjournment of the case, we are not inclined to accede to the said request as arguments of the appellants have been concluded. Nevertheless, we have perused the material on record and considered the judgments of the learned Trial Court and the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court.

7. Prior to the institution of the present suit on 14.08.1982, there was a decree in an earlier suit filed by the defendant-appellant as the plaintiff wherein a declaration of the validity of the adoption had been made (Suit No.440/222/1979). In the present suit the defendant-appellant had filed a written statement, inter alia, pointing out that the plaintiff was bound by the decree in the said suit i.e. Suit No. 440/222/1979. Suit No. 440/222/1979 was decreed on 26.02.1982 and the said decree was affirmed in appeal upto this Court. Yet the original plaintiff did not implead herself in any of the said proceedings, at any stage, to contest the decree in favour of the validity of the adoption of the defendant-appellant by Nanuwa.

8. The adoption deed dated 07.06.1977 is a registered deed. Under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act") there is a presumption in law as what is recorded in the said deed.

9. The High Court while construing the said adoption deed has taken the view that the persons who had given the defendant-appellant in adoption to Nanuwa had not signed the adoption deed as executant's thereof and had appended their signatures thereto as attesting witnesses. The said finding of fact does not appear to be correct on a perusal of the copy of the adoption deed which is on record. We have noticed from a perusal of the adoption deed that apart from the natural guardians of the defendant-appellant who had given the defendant appellant in adoption to Nanuwa there were other persons who had signed the deed. Even otherwise, the view taken by the High Court with regard to the deed in question and the provisions of Section 16 of the Act appears to be contrary to what has been said by this Court in the case of Laxmibai (Dead) Through Lrs. and Anr. v. Bhagwantbuval (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. reported in (2013) 4 SCC 97, particularly what has been recorded in paragraphs 31 and 34 of the report which may be reproduced as under :

"31. Mere technicalities therefore, cannot defeat the purpose of adoption, particularly when the respondent-defendants have not made any attempt to disprove the said document. No reference was ever made either by them, or by their witnesses, to this document i.e. registered adoption deed. Undoubtedly, the natural parents had signed along with 7 witnesses and not at the place where the executant's could sign. But it is not a case where there were no witnesses except the executant's. Instead of two witnesses, seven attesting witnesses put their signatures.

34. The trial Court in this regard has held that the fact that the natural patents of the adoptive child had signed along