SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DEEPAK GUPTA, ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.
Vinay Eknath Lad - Appellant
Versus
Chiu Mao Chen - Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 4726 of 2010
Decided on : 18-12-2019
(A) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 116 – Estoppel of tenant – Termination of lease – Principle of estoppel bars a tenant from questioning title landlords – But this principle cannot be made applicable in present case straightaway as main defence set up by tenant is that he had acknowledged said partnership firm as landlord but questioned locus standi of plaintiffs who operated under same trade name – In absence of attornment or public notice of dissolution, defendant had no way of having knowledge of change of landlord of subject-premises from partnership firm to a co-ownership concern. (Paras 8)
(B) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 106 – Partnership Act, 1932 – Section 48 – Eviction of tenant – Termination of lease – Original plaintiffs claim to have had derived their right, title and interest to subject premises from partnership firm after its dissolution – It is not the law that in a landlord-tenant suit landlord cannot be called upon at all to prove his ownership of a premises, but onus is not on him to establish perfect title of suit property – Plaint, exhibits and deposition of plaintiffs’ witness do not adequately explain journey of subject premises from erstwhile partnership firm which had inducted mother of present defendant as a tenant, to seventeen individuals operating as a co-ownership firm – Original plaintiffs’ title to subject-premises came from residue assets of dissolved firm – In a landlord-tenant suit, landlord is not required to prove his title in subject property as in a title suit – But when landlord’s derivative title is challenged, same has to be established in some form – On this point original plaintiffs have failed before first two Courts – Judgment under appeal set aside and matter remanded to High Court for read judicating rival claims and defence. (Paras 12, 14, 19 and 20)
Facts of the case:
Tenancy dispute. Trial Court decreed the suit for possession as well as mesne profit from date of service of notice of termination. The defendant was given six months’ time to vacate subject-premises. The defendant, however, was successful in his appeal before High Court and judgment of the Trial Court was reversed. The present appellant is the successor-in-interest of the seventeen individuals who had instituted the suit in the name of joint proprietary firm. Main question which arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether the original plaintiffs had the locus to institute the suit or not.
Findings of Court:
Sufficient material was not there before the first two Courts to establish the original plaintiffs’ claim of ownership of the subject premises on the basis of a family arrangement after dissolution of the firm. The appellant’s attempt to adduce additional documents to establish his stand on that point has been rejected by us at this stage.
Result : Appeals allowed.
Key Points: - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!) - (!)
JUDGMENT :
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
The appellant before us is the owner of a premises comprising of a shop room, numbered 3 in the ground floor of Sabari Complex, Residency Road, Richmond Town, Bengaluru 560025. This premises is the subject of dispute in this appeal. The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was instituted by “Sri Sabari Corporation” styled as a co-ownership firm comprising of seventeen individuals. All these individuals were also described as plaintiffs (a) to (q) in the suit in the capacity of co-owners. They shall be referred to later in this judgment as the “original plaintiffs”. The mother of the sole respondent was inducted as the lessee of the subject-premises on 10th May, 1978. At that point of time, the owner of the premises was a partnership firm with the same trade name. Admitted position is that on his mother’s death in the year 1996, the respondent became the tenant of the subject premises. The original plaintiffs through their learned Advocates issued a notice terminating the lease in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 25/27th September, 2006. In this notice, the nature of occupation has been interchangeably used as “tenancy” and “lease”, but that factor is not of much significance for determining the rights of the parties in this appeal. The suit was instituted in the Court of the XII City Civil Judge, Bangalore on 15th November 2006 claiming, inter-alia, delivery of vacant possession of the subject premises and mesne profit. We shall subsequently refer to the respondent as defendant. The original plaintiffs claim to have had derived their right, title and interest to the subject premises from the partnership firm after its dissolution. It has been contended on their behalf that some of them are the erstwhile partners and others are their relatives and they came to own the subject premises as residue property in accordance with Section 48 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The Trial Court decreed the suit for possession as well as mesne profit from the date of service of notice of termination. The defendant was given six months’ time to vacate the subject-premises. The defendant, however, was successful in his appeal before the High Court and the judgment of the Trial Court was reversed. The present appellant is the successor-in-interest of the seventeen individuals who had instituted the suit in the name of joint proprietary firm. This appellant claims to have had purchased the subject premises from the original owners. His substitution in this appeal was allowed by this Court by an order passed on 7th January, 2010.
2. The main question which arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether the original plaintiffs had the locus to institute the suit or not. The suit was resisted by the defendant on the ground that the said plaintiffs could not have had terminated the tenancy as they did not have jural relationship with the defendant to initiate the action. It has been urged in support of this contention that there was no attornment in this case and no public notice was issued on dissolution of the firm as per the provisions of Section 45(1) of the 1932 Act. The original plaintiffs’ stand on devolution of the subject premises has been contested by the defendant. It is his contention that if the devolution came through at all, the process of such devolution was through conveyance of immovable property but without effecting registration on payment of proper stamp duty. Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that for this reason, the instruments through which such devolution is sought to be established ought not to be taken cognizance of in a judicial proceeding. The other issues which have been raised are ancillary to this main question. Before we proceed to examine this question of law, we shall have to refer to certain facts from which the present controversy originates. At the time the lease was created, the partnership firm comprised of seven partners and a minor
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