The right to the pension should be asserted within the period of limitation, and the suit of the respondent was clearly barred by limitation.

ORDER :

Ruma Pal, J.

Leave granted.

2. The only issue in this case relates to the question of limitation in relation to the respondent's assertion of her right to pension under the Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme. The respondent's husband had claimed that he was a freedom fighter. He applied for grant of pension under the Scheme. His application was rejected in 1973 on two grounds (1) that he had not undergone imprisonment for the period of six months, and (2) his annual income was more than Rs. 5000. The respondent's husband did not choose to challenge this order till the date of his death twenty years later, in 1993. In 1995 the respondent filed a suit in which she had claimed the pension. Her claim was decreed together with 18% interest. The appellant's appeal from the decree was dismissed on the ground that the loss of pension is a recurring loss and that the cause of action was a continuing one.

3. The High Court erred in holding that the cause of action was a recurring one. A right to the pension should be asserted within the period of limitation. The right having been established, the right to receive the pension would then be a continuing one. The right not having been established within the period of limitation the suit of the respondent was clearly barred by limitation. We are fortified in our view by the recent decision of this Court in Union of India v. Punjab Singh, (2003) 10 SCC 36 : (2003) 7 Scale 480 (2).

4. The decision relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent, namely, Mukund Lal Bhandari v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 2 has no bearing on the issue of limitation. That was a decision where the claim of freedom fighters had been rejected on the ground not only that the petitioners had not produced the required proof in support of their claim but also because they had filed their applications for pension before the Government after the date prescribed by the Scheme.

5. The second submission was rejected by saying (Mukund Lal case, Mukund Lal Bhandari v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 2 SCC p. 6, para 7):

"We, therefore, cannot countenance the plea of the Government that the claimant's would only be entitled to the benefit of the Scheme if they made applications before a particular date notwithstanding that in fact they had suffered the imprisonment and made the sacrifices and were thus otherwise qualified to receive the benefit. We are, therefore, of the view that whatever the date on which the claimants make the applications, the benefit should be made available to them. The date prescribed in any past or future notice inviting the claims, should be regarded more as a matter of administrative convenience than as a rigid time-limit."

It is clear that this paragraph relates to the period of limitation prescribed in the Scheme and not to the period statutorily prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963.

6. In the case before us, the respondent's husband's application was rejected in 1973 on merits. It is this rejection which gave rise to the cause of action for filing the suit. The respondent's husband did not challenge the decision for 20 years. Two years after his death, his wife purported to do so by filing a civil suit. The claim was barred under the Limitation Act, 1963 as the right to receive pension at all was in issue. The High Court erred in holding that the cause of action was a recurring one for the reasons already stated.

7. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The decision of the High Court is set aside.

8. No costs.

Appeal allowed.