ORDER :

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant has questioned the correctness of order dated 11.3.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court whereby he condoned 1236 days delay in filing of appeal by the respondent against judgment and decree dated 18.8.2006 passed by V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as, 'the trial Court').

3. After purchasing the suit property from the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board, the appellant filed OS No. 381 of 2006 for delivery of possession and mesne profits. The trial Court decreed the suit vide ex- parte judgment dated 18.8.2006. In the execution proceedings, the respondent was evicted from the suit premises. After about one year he filed IA No. 174 of 2007 under Order 9 Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code for setting aside ex- parte decree. The same was dismissed by the trial Court vide order dated 20.2.2008. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 341 of 2008 filed by the respondent was dismissed by the High Court vide judgment dated 11.12.2008.

4. After almost four years of the passing of ex-parte decree by the trial Court and one year and eight months of the dismissal of CMA No. 341 of 2008 by the High Court, the respondent filed an appeal under Section 96 CPC. He also filed an application for condonation of 1236 days delay by stating that he handed over the papers to the counsel on 10.1.2009 for the purpose of preparing the grounds of appeal but the certified copies of the documents were misplaced by the office of the Advocate and the same could not be traced despite best efforts and further that on 2.3.2010, the counsel discovered that the documents had been inadvertently tagged with the record of A.S. No.200/2001.

5. Learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the respondent's explanation and condoned the delay by observing that there were some latches on the part of the counsel but the respondent cannot be penalised for the same.

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation.

7. The expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years Courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay.

8. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 this Court made a departure from the earlier judgments in which strict interpretation was placed on the expression "sufficient cause" and observed:

"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted